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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines factors shaping conflict-sensitive aid programming in Sri 
Lanka. These factors include theory, geopolitics, and institutional structures of aid 
agencies. Two case studies illustrate forces shaping programming. The first study 
demonstrates that authoritarian control by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the 
Wanni has undermined standard development approaches without a corresponding re- 
evaluation of strategies. The second study investigate~ peace and conflict impact 
assessments. Current methodologies have difficulty demonstrating program impacts. 
Holistic definitions of conflict-sensitive aid, lack of conceptual clarity behind projects, 
and weak assessment mean that forces external to peace-building concerns readily shape 
conflict-sensitive aid strategies. In addition, different approaches to conflict-sensitive aid 
are informed by competing theories of both causation of conflict and how to instigate 
change. Support for the peace dividend, a primary peace-building strategy of major 
donors in Sri Lanka, exemplifies how peace-building strategies informed by competing 
ideologies and interests undermine conflict-sensitive objectives. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODS 
In The Anti-Politics Machine, Ferguson (1990) analyses the development industry 
in Lesotho in the early 1980s. In the introduction to the book, he condemns international 
development aid in Lesotho as a failure. He does not mince his words, and claims that 
there is universal agreement with Murray's statement that "the history of development 
projects in Lesotho is one of almost unremitting failure to achieve their objectives" 
(Murray 1981 : 19 cited in Ferguson, 1990: 8). Ferguson then calls for an examination of 
development institutions outside of their own development problematic in order to 
capture the political ramifications of their discourses. 
It is tempting to start a study of conflict-sensitive aid programming in Sri Lanka 
with a parallel dismissal. Conflict-sensitive aid programming, for the purposes of this 
thesis, is defined as an approach to humanitarian and development aid that seeks to 
understand, mitigate, and proactively shape the impact of interventions upon conflict 
situations in which aid organizations work. Hundreds of aid programs aimed at 
alleviating the conflict in Sri Lanka have not seen a decisive end to the war which the 
country has undergone since 1983. There is much debate over how successful conflict- 
sensitive programs have been at achieving more modest objectives. Several 
commentators observe that the conflict resolution mandates adopted by international aid 
agencies make the conflict worse (Wickramasinghe, 2001 ; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 
2003a; Bastian, 2003). Nonetheless, the number of programs designed as 'peace- 
building' or 'conflict-sensitive' in Sri Lanka rapidly increases (Mayer et al. 2003). 
Attempting to judge the success of conflict-sensitive aid programming raises 
several questions for aid agencies. How does one define conflict-sensitivity in a practical 
manner, and how does one know when it has been achieved? Does peace imply merely 
lack of military confrontation, or does it include elements of social justice? What are the 
trade-offs between latent and active conflict? How do organizations engage conflict while 
maintaining a position of political neutrality? 
Different conflict-sensitive strategies, be they rights-based, aimed at 
reconciliation, or focused on the economy of war, offer competing and at times mutually 
exclusive answers to these questions. These answers shape and are shaped by concepts of 
conflict itself, and in turn shape programs implemented. The parallel with Ferguson's 
critique of development discourse is now direct. He states that: 
...' development' institutions generate their own form of discourse, and 
this discourse simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a particular kind of 
object of knowledge, and creates a structure of knowledge around that 
object. Interventions are then organized on the basis of this structure of 
knowledge (1 990: xiv). 
In the context of international aid, conflict-sensitivity is a younger term than 
development. It has fewer established meanings and politics attached to its usage. 
Conflict-sensitivity is frequently referred to in broad, inexact ways to cover a variety of 
contradictory ideas and approaches. The fluidity and breadth of the concept leave it open 
to abuse. The concept's malleability gives geo-political forces and organizational 
structures great latitude in shaping programming choices. It is easy for organizations to 
describe work in which they are already engaged as having positive impacts on the 
conflict. 
The use of selective definitions of conflict-sensitivity to describe current 
programming is common practice in Sri Lanka. This is the case amongst agencies ranging 
from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to locally focused international non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs). An example is found in those parts of the Wanni 
region controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), where the description 
of aid initiatives as conflict-sensitive facilitates the continuation and creation of 
development projects in a political context which precludes substantive participatory 
development models. 
Aims of the thesis 
This thesis examines the interplay between concepts and practices of conflict- 
sensitive aid work in Sri Lanka. 'Aid' is used here to refer jointly to the fields of 
humanitarian relief and development. The thesis initially surveys ideologies and theories 
informing differing strategies of conflict-sensitive aid, including perceptions both of 
conflict and of appropriate and effective ways to bring about change. It then investigates 
the types of programming pursued by donors and aid agencies in Sri Lanka, seeking to 
uncover reasons why agencies choose certain strategies over others. To this end, the 
thesis examines both geopolitical pressures as well as organizational structures which 
shape programming decisions. The thesis further focuses on how ongoing practice is 
given meaning within a conflict-sensitivity framework, and how practitioners seek to 
identify and discriminate between good and bad practices. Examining conflict-sensitive 
aid in Sri Lanka offers a case study of current practice in the field. It also provides insight 
into the impacts of conflict sensitive aid, both intended and unintended. 
Importance of examining conflict-sensitivity 
Mitigating the ways by which aid programs aggravate violent conflict is of 
pressing concern. In several recent conflicts humanitarian actors have played important 
roles in contributing to combatants' capacity for war. A notorious example of this was in 
the refugee camps in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo between 1994 and 1996. 
Support of the camps by international aid agencies facilitated the reorganization of 
ghocidaire militia at the end of the Rwanda genocide. Interventions such as these have 
led to strong criticism of blind adherence to technical, codified humanitarian mandates at 
the expense of overall impact (Terry, 2002). Conflict-sensitivity addresses these issues. 
Debates over conflict-sensitive programming involve more than simply 
comparing strategies for intended or ongoing activities. Frameworks of interpreting 
conflict and forms of engagement with conflict emerge from conflict-sensitivity and 
peace-building theory, as well as underlying ideologies. Heywood calls ideologies "ideas, 
doctrines and theories that have been adopted by various ideological traditions" (1 992: 
5). The term 'ideologies' is used in this thesis to refer to categories which are relatively 
static and less open to negotiation than the theories and ideas which comprise them. 
Frameworks of interpretation both shape and are shaped by the fields in which aid 
agencies work. For example, by linking underdevelopment with conflict IFIs are able to 
describe national economic reform programs as peace-building activities. These 
initiatives in turn create positive and negative incentives in Sri Lanka's war economy. 
Conflict-sensitive approaches are part of a struggle between conflicting 
ideologies, from realist to radical, in the larger context of foreign interventions. As Said 
(1979) has convincingly demonstrated, frameworks of understanding are instruments of 
power in and of themselves, and need to be understood as such. The voices of realist 
security, apolitical humanitarianism, liberal multilateralism, and radical change can be 
found in debates over the appropriate role of aid. These voices should be recognized in 
analyses and in proposed aid interventions in conflict situations. 
A pertinent example is the use of aid to justify international military interventions. 
Humanitarian considerations are increasingly being used as a basis from which to 
challenge state sovereignty in international conflicts. Events in the current Iraq crisis, as 
well as the wars in Kosovola and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have led to political re- 
evaluations of the international state system, of international codes of human rights, and 
of the humanitarian ethic (Hubert and Bonser, 200 1 ; International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, 200 1). Realist strategies of achieving peace through 
military victory stand in contrast with peace-building strategies which describe the basis 
for peace in personal and community relationships (Lederach, 1997). Constructions of 
conflict-sensitivity position themselves within, reflect, and affect this evolving struggle 
over peace-building strategies. 
Figure 2 United States Navy Advertisement 
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (December 27,2003) 
Sri Lanka centre stage 
Peace-building and conflict-sensitive aid practices vary across space. This is true 
both internationally and within Sri Lanka. In the summer of 2003, conflict-sensitive 
programming was of greater importance to international aid discourse in Sri Lanka than 
in many other countries in conflict or 'post-conflict' scenarios. In another South Asian 
example, Nepal, conflict-sensitive approaches were became common much later, and 
then only in a context of large downscaling of aid due to the escalating conflict. A foreign 
aid worker noted that in Nepal in 2002 only two organizations, the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the INGO Centre Canadien d'Etude et de 
Coopkation Internationale (CECI), were seriously developing conflict-sensitive 
approaches (interview 1). 
Donor and practitioner discourse on conflict-sensitivity is central to aid 
programming in Sri Lanka today. The majority of new program proposals in Sri Lanka 
address project impacts on conflict, responding to new donor sensibilities. International 
agencies see Sri Lanka as a relatively stable country in which to develop new types of 
programming. Improved safety in areas held by the secessionist LTTE since the cease- 
fire in February 2002 was cited by several organizations as being a precondition to their 
new organizational directions (interviews 2 and 3). 
A parallel situation exists within academia. Peace-building and conflict resolution 
are central themes of current academic inquiry in Sri Lanka. Several institutions in 
Colombo, including the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies and the Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, study evolving conflict-sensitive aid practices. Two UK universities, 
Bradford and Oxford, carry out annual study visits to Sri Lanka for MA students in the 
field of peace-building. Research has tended to focus on dynamic policy shifts proposed 
or undertaken by the non-governmental sector, at the expense of research on IFIs. While 
the IFIs have proven less innovative, they continue to command the large majority of aid 
flows. 
This thesis examines different strategies of conflict-sensitive programming both 
across Sri Lanka and between different types of aid agencies. These agencies differ in the 
degree of access which they have to those parts of the country controlled by the LTTE. 
This regional variation offers insight into both political and institutional processes behind 
specific, valued strategies. 
Strategy 
The field-based research for this thesis took place during a three-month period in 
Sri Lanka from May to July of 2003. The research made use of several methods. The 
most important of these was interviews, both informal and formal. More than 100 
structured and informal interviews were conducted. Interviews were selected via three 
strategies. One was intentional sampling. This entailed a specific targeting of 
organizations and individuals whom I considered would provide pertinent insight. The 
majority of these interviews were with academics and officials of governmental, 
multinational, and non-governmental development agencies. The second strategy was a 
'snowball effect'. This entailed asking people during or after interviews to recommend 
other individuals or organizations who they felt might be useful. The final strategy was 
less structured, and involved interviewing individuals met informally throughout my stay 
in and travels around Sri Lanka. This final strategy provided the most abundant material 
from perspectives outside of those immediately engaged in either practice or analysis of 
relief and development work in Sri Lanka. 
My research also involved direct participation with aid organizations. I briefly 
worked as a consultant for an international non-governmental development organization 
in the Wanni, doing a donor assessment of a project with a conflict-sensitive mandate. 
This placement facilitated my access to the central LTTE-controlled areas around 
Mullaitivu, an area difficult to access for solely academic reasons. I also participated in 
academic conferences and meetings in Colombo, Negombo and Vavuniya. The Peace and 
Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Conference, held in Negombo June 13-1 5,2003, was 
a valuable opportunity to see a wide range of government officials, aid practitioners, 
donors and academics debate the theory and practicality of the emerging PCIA field. 
Analysis of primary documentation was a further method of research. This 
occurred both in Sri Lanka and upon return to Vancouver. As understandings of conflict- 
sensitive aid practice are of central interest to this paper, the ways in which agencies 
formulate and eventually publish these understandings have proven a useful source of 
insight. As such, organizational articulations of strategies, institutional conflict analyses 
(or lack thereof), and debate over assessment techniques offered plentiful resources for 
analysis. The sources examined for this thesis included both publicly available documents 
as well as documents which were offered to me during interviews. A list of these 
documents has been included in Appendix One. 
Situating myself 
Accepting Brun's (2003) comment that it may be impossible to fully reveal 
perspective, it is nonetheless useful to reflect on how my personal experience and 
approach affected the way in which the research for this thesis was directed and 
interpreted. Before returning to academia to study conflict-sensitive aid programming, I 
had spent the better part of two years working for humanitarian organizations in conflict 
zones in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. I arrived at university 
personally concerned with many of the critiques of relief and development programming 
which are laid out in the literature review in chapter 2. While these concerns led to in- 
depth study of systemic critiques of the aid industry, my personal direction was tempered 
by a continued strong commitment to future practice in the field. Despite the profundity 
and breadth of ways in which aid initiatives have been shown to be a fraught enterprise, I 
do not believe that these critiques invalidate the project as a whole. 
This concern with practice can be seen in the focus of my research. The majority 
of my interviews were with people working in or analyzing the field of conflict-sensitive 
aid. My analysis has tried to take a step back from immediate project concerns to look at 
the larger ideological, geopolitical and institutional factors shaping the emergence of 
conflict-sensitive practice in Sri Lanka. I have borrowed from Ferguson (2000) the idea 
that the aid industry can be shaped and driven by forces disconnected from the intended 
goals and mandates of organizations and individuals involved. I retain, however, the 
intention of displaying these forces in a way which may allow practitioners to more 
thoughtfully and effectively minimize the negative impacts of their programming on the 
conflict in which they operate. 
Evolution of strategy and a reflection on research ideals 
The initial research focus and methods described in my project proposal changed 
substantially during my work in Sri Lanka. This was not entirely unexpected. My 
proposal laid out a variety of possible methods designed to give me the greatest flexibility 
in dealing with what I anticipated would be a dynamic research environment. 
My thesis proposal discussed my concerns with issues of access, particularly to 
internally displaced people (IDPs). In the end, negotiating access to internally displaced 
people proved sufficiently difficult that no formal interviews were carried out. Barriers 
were encountered at two levels. The SFU ethics committee presented a structural barrier. 
Concerned with the potential negative psychological impacts of my research on displaced 
people, the committee took four months to grant me permission to carry out interviews. 
Permission was granted on the condition that I have a guarantee from the NGO with 
which I was collaborating that they would provide psycho-social care for those negatively 
impacted by my intervention. As this was not a practical commitment for an NGO to 
undertake, this stipulation effectively barred any formal interview process. 
A further barrier was presented by academics. As relatively disempowered 
people, as people categorized by their very disempowerment, IDPs find themselves and 
their status the focus of both political pressures and struggles between ideologies within 
the aid industry and within academia. Concerns over representation, cooption of voice, 
and exploitation of IDPs' stories for personal academic advancement all complicate the 
research process. Researchers must answer to criticisms of 'mining' subjects for 
information, taking what is useful for their projects and offering nothing in return, or for 
simply engaging in "theoretical tourism on the part of the first world critic, where the 
margin becomes a linguistic or critical vacation, a new poetics of the exotic" (Kaplan 
cited in Hyndman 2001 : 263). Concerns such as these were frequently voiced by Sri 
Lankan academics I interviewed during the early period of my research in Sri Lanka. My 
status as a young Canadian academic with little local experience on a relatively short- 
term research project without local institutional affiliation was not in my favour. These 
factors also discouraged me from formal research with IDPs. This problematization of 
interaction to the point of the exclusion of interaction altogether is not a process with 
which I was comfortable. 
The critique of academic research being a process of 'mining7 is broader than the 
context of working with IDPs, however. All fieldwork should have positive benefits for 
those who are being studied. This is reflected in the guidelines of the SFU ethics 
committee. Section 7.5 states that benefits of the research should include "specific 
advantages to subjects, to third parties, or to society or a segment thereof, and any general 
increase in human knowledge" (University Research Ethics Review (20.01), 2001). On 
the academic side, this research addresses this concern in a couple of ways. The 
information and analysis documented in this research will be disseminated both through 
the distribution of the thesis to some of those who participated, and through the 
publication of articles for public consumption. A further positive impact of my research 
was to bring conflict-sensitive programming issues to the attention of people engaged in 
the aid field in Sri Lanka. Interviews which were initially allocated short periods of time 
were frequently prolonged as people became engaged with the subject. People 
interviewed also frequently asked for information and suggestions on conflict-sensitive 
programming. I provided feedback after interviews on several occasions. 
The SFU ethics committee's directive 7.5 addresses more than dissemination of 
research findings. It also touches on the idea of active engagement with the issues being 
researched. Schrijvers (1995) presents a study of the difficulties associated with assuring 
a proper fusion between research and activism. When authorities once again displaced 
displaced people with whom Schrijvers worked in Colombo, she tried to assist her 
research subjects, with some success, by intervening with authorities, NGOs, and 
charities. 
From the perspective of aid practice, what stands out in this example is that 
activism occupies an area overlapping academia and aid work. While Schrijvers is critical 
of top-down NGO relief structures, her fusion of aid and activism also lends support to 
research with the objective of improving aid practice. This research has the aim to 
improve practice in conflict-sensitive relief and development programs in Sri Lanka. 
Organization of the thesis 
This first chapter has introduced the aims of the thesis. It also outlines the 
significance of the research, both in Sri Lanka and in the broader context of aid 
programming. It concludes with a discussion of the methods used, and how these 
methods shaped the research process. Chapter two is a literature review. It starts by 
briefly describing the fields of humanitarian relief and development. The chapter then 
situates conflict-sensitive aid in relation to these two fields. After defining conflict- 
sensitivity the chapter surveys underlying ideologies informing different approaches to 
conflict-sensitive practice. Chapter three provides background and context to the conflict 
in Sri Lanka. It surveys some conflict analyses of the Sri Lankan conflict. It also gives 
background on the role of the international community in the conflict. 
Chapter four, the first empirically-based chapter, examines conflict-sensitive 
programming in the LTTE-occupied Wanni region of Sri Lanka. Due to strict, 
authoritarian control by this local authority, aid organizations face obstacles to standard 
approaches such as community empowerment, capacity building, and civil society 
strengthening. This detailed study illustrates how NGO mandates are influenced by 
external pressures. It also describes how the strategy of support for the peace dividend, a 
primary strategy of major donors in Sri Lanka, shapes local programming choices. 
Examining assessment tools and processes offers insight into the interplay 
between the theories, values, and practice of conflict-sensitive aid work. Chapter five 
analyzes documents, projects, and practices in the emerging field of PCIA. The chapter 
then examines the peace-building strategy of supporting the peace dividend as a case 
study of current PCIA practice. The strategy of support for the peace both highlights 
problems currently facing PCIAs in Sri Lanka, and outlines political and institutional 
forces shaping both PCIA and conflict-sensitive aid practice. 
CHAPTER 2 
PLACING TERMS 
This chapter first briefly outlines the fields of relief and development aid, referred 
to by Ferguson (2000) as an industry. Both 'humanitarian' and 'development' are terms 
used with great familiarity, as if they appeal to commonly understood practices. Upon 
closer examination, contradictions can be found in the breadth of uses of these concepts. 
With this grounding, the chapter moves on to examine conflict sensitivity. Conflict 
sensitivity is placed in a context of a broad spectrum of related terms, whose meanings 
are often used interchangeably. Conflict sensitivity is a proactive concept, based on 
established conceptual frameworks of conflict and conflict resolution. These frameworks 
and the ideologies behind them are discussed here. 
Humanitarianism 
Humanitarianism has broad and contrasting uses. In political science literature, 
'humanitarian intervention' is frequently synonymous with military adventurism (Garrett, 
1999). The term is also used in reference to 'just wars'. As an example, the Kosovo/a war 
of 1999 is widely referred to as a 'humanitarian war' (McRae, 2001). This thesis uses a 
much more circumscribed definition of humanitarianism, applying it only those 
organizations which operate within the framework of the Humanitarian Charter 
(SPHERE, 2004). The charter states that organizations must be impartial, work within the 
bounds of international humanitarian law, and provide for the basic needs of civilians 
regardless of their political affiliation. It applies to non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), non-governmental agencies (such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC)), and inter-governmental agencies (such as UN agencies). The charter also 
advocates the right to humanitarian assistance over all other political considerations. 
Humanitarian practitioners have long claimed to be both neutral and impartial 
(Macrae, 1998; Anderson, 1999). These claims have a distinct history. Modern relief 
agencies trace their conceptual origins to the foundation of the ICRC following the Battle 
of Solferino in 1859. The principals of the ICRC informed the Geneva Conventions in 
1949 (Macrae, 1998). The creation of MSF out of the ICRC following the Biafra war set 
a principle of independence to which INGOs remain fiercely attached (Maecins sans 
Frontiltres, 2004b). 
The validity of claims to political neutrality and impartiality have been 
convincingly dismissed (Anderson, 1999). The distribution of substantial economic 
resources in conflict situations is an impossible task without affecting power balances. 
Furthermore, humanitarian aid is increasingly being used by donor governments as a 
strategy to avoid political involvement in regions in which they do not have geopolitical 
interests (Terry, 2002). Despite high levels of funding, humanitarian relief is undergoing 
a crisis. This crisis is particularly acute in recipient countries where donor countries have 
geopolitical interests. Recent increased military involvement by donor countries in 
humanitarian crises has seen corresponding challenges to the validity of humanitarian 
neutrality. An example is offered by recent experience in Afghanistan. In the late 1990s, 
the United Nations (UN) was engaged in enforcing sanctions against the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan. The oppressive social policies of the Taliban regime were 
also a primary target of numerous international human rights NGOs. At the same time 
UN agencies and INGOs were running humanitarian activities in the country in 
cooperation with the Taliban regime. While this relationship was often conflictual, 
international agencies who focused primarily on service delivery were able to operate 
throughout the country. 
International agencies have greater difficulty today carrying out such dual 
mandates. Attacks aimed at relief workers in Afghanistan, Chechnya and elsewhere 
(Mklecins Sans Frontikres, 2004a) occur at substantially higher frequencies than in other 
conflicts taking place since records were initially compiled in 1997 (King, 2002). The 
bombings of the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
compounds in Baghdad on August 19 and October 27th 2003 respectively clearly 
demonstrated the political importance of aid, whether from the UN or by INGOs 
(Lederer, 2003). These events demonstrate that while humanitarian work is a response to 
conflict, it is also part of and frequently central to the conflict context. This assertion is 
one which the humanitarian community has had difficult accepting, and continues to 
deny (Macrae, 1998). 
Claiming that relief and development aid are central to the context of conflict is 
not new. Both academics and practitioners have long stressed the impacts of aid on 
conflict (Anderson, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Helton, 2002, Stemlau, 1977, Uvin, 1998). Nor 
do conceptual formulations of humanitarianism transcend practice. Conflicts in which 
humanitarian programs operate are the stage of contests over interpretations of practice, 
and choices of valued and appropriate means of response. This struggle can be seen in the 
debate which followed the killing of five humanitarian workers with Mklecins Sans 
Frontikres (MSF) in Afghanistan on June 2,2004. The agency responded by denouncing 
the manner by which "our own governments try to co-opt humanitarian actions for their 
own political and military ends" (Morley, 2004: 2). Morley pointed as an example to the 
distribution of leaflets by coalition forces that urged Afghans to "pass on any information 
related to [the] Taliban, al-Qaeda and Gulbaddin to the coalition forces ... in order to have 
a continuation of the provision of humanitarian aid" (ibid: I). In direct contradiction to 
Morley's claim to humanitarian neutrality, USAID administrator Andrew Nastios stated 
that relief agencies receiving US funding were "an arm of the US government" (cited in 
Burnett, 2004: 3). In a similar vein US Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that 
NGOs were "a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team" (ibid: 
2). Benard, an academic at the RAND corporation who is married to the US ambassador 
to Afghanistan, wrote that "the principle championed by Doctors Without Borders - that 
civilian professionals providing medical help to the suffering will be granted safe passage 
- is now part of our nostalgic past" (2004: 2). This view is the current trend in 
Afghanistan. While MSF withdrew from Afghanistan in July of 2004, during the same 
summer coalition forces in Afghanistan expanded a program of joint militarylcivilian 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). According to Colonel Branhagen, director of the 
US-led coalition civil military coordination centre in Kabul, these teams provide an ideal 
mix between humanitarian and security operations (irrinnews, 2004). 
Development 
Development is a word whose diversity of uses is even broader than that of 
humanitarianism. Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal call development "that slippery word 
whose meanings proliferate in blanket disregard to all attempts to fix and stabilize its 
referents" (2003: 1). While it lacks a precise definition, development is a powerful force 
of change. Sivaramakrishanan and Agrawal further describe development as "the most 
powerful influence structuring social and economic transformations in the non-Western 
world in the century" (2003: 1). Development is based on a progressive social and 
economic worldview. It refers both to movement towards a 'modern' society, and 
movement towards a better life (Ferguson, 2000). It is described as a Western paradigm, 
exported in the dialogues and institutions of colonialism (Said, 1979; Escobar, 1995). 
The mandates of development organizations today have their origins in the colonial era, 
as well as in the political contexts of the newly independent developing countries during 
the Cold War (de Alwis and Hyndman, 2002). The development concept evolved in the 
era of the withdrawal of overt European colonialism. Development can be seen as 
integral to the entire project of modernity. Sivaramakrishanan and Agrawal(2003) 
describe development as having legitimized both colonialism and independence 
movements, and having established the visions of newly independent states. 
Critiques of development address issues of power and domination. Arturo 
Escobar states that development is a mechanism that "links forms of knowledge about the 
Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the 
mapping and production of Third World (non-Western) societies, (where) individuals, 
governments and communities are seen as "underdeveloped" and treated as such" (cited 
in Lui, 2001 : 1 1 1). Ferguson (1 990) sees the principal result of development processes as 
the articulation of state power. Sceptical of analyses which reduce development to 
processes of control, Sinha states that in these critiques "the totality of domination 
produced by development projects seems to constitute an imperium, within which lie no 
possibilities of liberation" (2003: 287). He finds critiques of domination linked to a 
political project which places intrinsic value in the local and the indigenous. 
Two development models are of interest to this thesis. The first model is referred 
to as 'good governance, 'liberal global governance' or 'new humanitarianism' (Duffield, 
2001; Fox, 2001). Central tenants of this model are liberal democracy and capitalism. The 
model focuses on the national political level, promoting institutions of liberal democratic 
governance and capitalist economic systems. These policies are most apparent in 
international interventions in 'failed states' and entail a process of 'nation-building'. 
Principal agents of change at the national financial level are the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs). 
The second development model pertinent to this thesis is the model of community 
level social transformation. Participation and empowerment are principal objectives of 
this model. It developed largely through recognition of the patriarchal aspects of many 
established development models. Wickramasinghe (2001) notes that, over the last twenty 
years in Sri Lanka, the term 'partnership' has replaced aid. This form of aid is seen as 
egalitarian and responsible. One of its main tools is 'capacity-building7, which de Alwis 
and Hyndman describe as "a means of engaging and strengthening existing knowledge 
and skills" (2002: 8). While they refer to capacity-building as "an important departure 
from the development project" (ibid), this distinction is one of definition of development. 
Capacity-building and other participatory techniques are central to the approaches and 
mandates of many international development agencies (FORUT, 2001 and CARE, 
2003a). 
Participatory techniques have only partially addressed the critique that 
development continues to be complicit in a project of global liberal governance (Duffield, 
2001). Wickrarnasinghe (2001) sees the value of participation as an imported Western 
construct, and goes so far as to trace its origins to eighteenth century Protestant 
requirements for participation in the liturgy. Some development agencies place 
participatory processes as of greater intrinsic importance than quantitative outcomes, a 
tendency which Bastian refers to as the "tyranny of participation in development work in 
Sri Lanka" (interview 4). 
Development models which identify the state as a focal point of domination and 
power place civil society as independent from, and in opposition to, the state. Sinha 
describes this construction as ". . .the state and community as strictly separate domains, 
one the center of a network of domination, the other the domain from which other ways 
of seeing, doing, and being may emerge" (2003: 288). Foucault finds origins of this 
distinction in the development of liberalism in Europe. He notes that since liberalism 
developed partially as a response to highly interventionist eighteenth century German 
states, the state has since been caste as a necessary evil (cited in Danaher, Schirato and 
Webb, 2000). There are dissenters to the claim that community empowerment and local 
capacity building is a stabilizing process. Critics note that development is inherently 
destabilizing and conflictual. Prendergast writes that "conflict pervades development, 
causing massive disruption and suffering, rather than appearing occasionally or as an 
exception" (1 996: 1 12). 
Development and humanitarianism are often presented in contrast to one another, 
or as representing poles of a continuum. Various agencies limit their mandate to one 
sector or the other. Mdecins sans Fronti6res (2004~) withdrew from Sri Lanka on March 
1,2004, stating that the country was no longer in a conflict situation, and no longer 
required humanitarian assistance. This dichotomous categorization of context into either 
conflict or non-conflict is a very blunt tool by which to decipher and respond to evolving 
forms of violence and needs. Busumtwi-Sam (2002) argues that the humanitarian- 
development continuum fails during periods of transition from conflict to peace and 
proposes a third, post-conflict approach for these situations. One of Busumtwi-Sam's 
suggestions is the creation of a new funding framework specifically tailored to the 
requirements of operating in a post-conflict environment. Some donors have recently 
started using this approach. Examples include Norway's Transitional Funding mechanism 
(Smith, 2004). 
The relationship between different forms of aid is frequently inimical. 
Practitioners with organizations pursuing development-orientated models often express 
enmity towards humanitarian organizations, feeling that these organizations embody neo- 
colonial forms of intervention antithetical to their own mandates. (MacRae, 1998). MSF's 
entry into Nepal in a humanitarian capacity in 2003 was met with dismay by development 
organizations long-established in the country who felt that decades of community level 
empowerment work could be undermined by hierarchical, short-term approaches 
(interview 1). By the summer of 2004, many of the largest development donors had 
withdrawn from the country due to the continuing violence. 
There are however no clear boundaries between these organizations. While 
organizational structures may differ, relief organizations such as MSF and development 
organizations such as CARE are involved in both relief and long-term development 
activities. Much of the funding for both relief and development organizations comes from 
the same institutional donors, and there is constant cross-over of staff. With these 
considerations in mind, the term 'aid' will be used in this thesis to include both relief and 
development approaches, except where distinctions are necessary to the subject at hand. 
Deflning conflict sensitivity 
Conflict-sensitivity is a more recent term than development, and as such it is less 
established. A consortium of six agencies involved in developing Peace and Conflict 
Impact Assessments (PCIA) define conflict sensitivity as: 
. . .the need for organisations, in particular national governments, donors 
and civil society, to be sensitive to the (conflict) environments in which 
they operate, in order to reduce the negative impacts of their activities - 
and to increase their positive impacts - on the situation and its dynamics 
(FEWER et al. 2003a: 2). 
This holistic definition prioritizes inclusiveness over descriptive precision and 
operational usefulness. This is a parallel situation to broad definitions of the concept of 
"health" by aid agencies. 
Conflict sensitivity is situated in a field of related terms. The term conflict 
transformation was developed to move beyond concepts of conflict resolution as referring 
strictly to direct violence. Conflict transformation recognizes that conflict is intrinsic to 
human interactions and is not inherently negative. The goal of conflict transformation 
therefore is to transform conflict from violent to non-violent forms (Rupesinghe and 
Anderlini, 1998). This meaning has been adopted into other terms as well. The Canadian 
Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) states that "The overarching goal of 
peacebuilding is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without 
violence, as a means to achieve sustainable human security" (CPCC, 2004). 
Amongst aid practitioners, definitional clarity of conflict-sensitive programming 
does not exist. There is both contest and confusion as to the meaning of conflict 
sensitivity, appropriate and effective goals and approaches, and how to balance conflict 
sensitivity goals against other organizational objectives. These contests are not simply 
theoretical, but are enmeshed in the structures of the relief and development fields. 
Geopolitical pressures, organizational structures, donor trends, and individual relations all 
play a role in articulations of the concept. 
While some organizations continue to see a conflict-sensitive approach as outside 
of their operational mandate. Conflict-sensitive programming does not imply a change of 
core mandate, however. Kenneth Bush notes as an example that ". ..an education project 
may fail to produce students able to pass state-wide exams, but may succeed in reducing 
tensions between particular social groups by creating and institutionalizing a non- 
threatening and constructive environment that increases neutral contact.. ." (1998: 7). 
Most working definitions of conflict-sensitivity imply a pro-active role by the 
implementing agency. Anderson (1999) stresses that conflict-sensitive programming 
includes actively strengthening local capacities for peace. The PCIA definition states 
organizations should "increase their positive impacts" (FEWER, 2004). The line between 
conflict sensitivity and peace-building becomes blurred as programs are designed to have 
the maximum positive impact on conflict context. Rehabilitation of the Wanni gains 
greater priority amongst donors if it is felt that it contributes to political stabilization. In 
strategizing 'positive impact', conflict-sensitive programming models work within 
conceptual frameworks of what conflict is, what are its causes, and how it can be 
resolved. 
Peace-building and ideologies 
Conflict-sensitive aid programming is intrinsically linked to schools of conflict 
analysis. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse point out how polemology, the study of 
war, "has from the start been seen as the essential prerequisite for normative conflict 
resolution" (1 999: 65). Non-western conceptual frameworks of conflict are of undoubted 
import to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The role of the Hindu warrior laid out by the 
Bhagavad Gita (1 897) differs starkly from that in western militaries. This epic affirms 
that the dharmic duty of the Hindu warrior is to fulfill his caste role. Successful attention 
to this duty will result in favourable rebirth. At the battle of Kuruksetra, Krishna informs 
the wavering Arjuna that as a warrior, killing his own relatives in battle is not 
dishonourable. The extent to which Hindu beliefs shape perceptions of war amongst the 
Tamil Tigers is beyond the scope of this thesis, however. The thesis investigates concepts 
of and responses to conflict by international aid agencies, which are largely informed by 
western models. 
Texts on conflict resolution generally stress the importance of addressing several 
levels of causation at the same time (Anderson, 1999; Rupesinghe, 1998). Goodhand's 
(2001) conflict analysis of Sri Lanka runs the gauntlet of causes from the militarization of 
society to unequal access to educational opportunities. Theories of causation of conflict 
also compete, however. Lederach compared the quarrels between international relations 
and conflict resolution as a "spat between two siblings, . ..who situate themselves along a 
rather odd continuum that runs from "realism" to "emotionalism"" (1997: 24). This thesis 
does not attempt to discern one model of conflict analysis as more successful or more 
appropriate in Sri Lanka. Instead, it traces the effects of competition between differing 
values, ideologies, theories, and strategies on the policy and practice of aid agencies. The 
following section briefly outlines different ideologies informing peace-building models. 
Realism 
The realist model of conflict is based on the need for physical security, which is 
provided by the state. The model sees state actors as rational, self-interested, and trapped 
in the international state system in which every other actor is also self-interested. This 
model is referred to as the security dilemma. Natural opportunism and the search for 
security are therefore causes of war (Uyangoda, 2003a). Taken to its logical extreme, this 
view eliminates a distinction between just and unjust wars, but rather posits them as 
intrinsic to the system within which they are situated (Garrett, 1999). The state system 
also defines possible and impossible solutions to conflict. This logic can be seen in the 
LTTE's historical claim that the security of Tamils can only be assured in an independent 
state. The realist model sees conflict as two dimensional. Uyangoda refers to this 
dichotomy as "peace is the absence of war" (2003b). This warlno war definition limits 
the number of possible responses by aid organizations. OYHanlon (2003) claims that 
intervening countries have only three options: to help overthrow one side in the conflict, 
to physically separate antagonists, or to set up humanitarian safe havens. 
Critiques of realist theories claim that statist ideas of self-determination have been 
surpassed (O'Duffy, 2003). There exists today a range of polities with differing degrees 
of autonomy. There is also greater transnational involvement in national conflicts, 
including support from diasporas, the growth of globalized networks dealing in illicit 
resource and arms markets, and support for terrorist movements (Helton, 2002; 
Hyndman, 2003; Terry, 2002). In Sri Lanka, there is ongoing struggle over the definition 
of the state. Attempts to institutionalize a non-statist power-sharing mechanism between 
the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has proven a major obstacle to the 
continuation of peace talks. 
More recent realist analysis extends beyond the state model. Theoretical links 
have been drawn between poverty/underdevelopment and the security concerns of those 
in the North. Overpopulation, disease, and political instability in failed states are seen as 
threats from the underdeveloped South. These concerns are reflected in the mandates of 
aid agencies (Shaw, 2002; Collier et al. 2003). 
Both individual and state security remain dominant discourses in Sri Lanka. 
Gunaratna opines that: 
. . .addressing the traditional Tamil grievances.. . cannot end the Sri 
Lankan conflict. . . .the paramount grievance of the affected Tamils is the 
inability of the Sri Lankan state to provide security to Sri Lanka and to 
meet the challenge of their aspiration to statehood (2001: 1). 
This claim reverses the realist argument in support of Tamil statehood and finds 
lack of security for Tamils as a justification for a stronger military response by the GoSL 
against the LTTE. 
Liberalism 
The individual is the cornerstone of the liberal tradition. To protect individual 
freedoms, liberalism dictates that the role of the state should be minimized in all domains, 
including economic. This concern with freedom from state coercion has become 
institutionalized as civil rights (Eccleshall, 2001). The concept of freedom is interpreted 
in different ways. Libertarianism values the minimal possible amount of state coercion 
upon the individual. In contrast, the welfare model values equality of opportunity and 
outcome. The terms negative and positive liberties, used respectively for these 
approaches, are a direct parallel to Galtung's negative and positive peace, described in 
the conflict resolution section below (ibid). As with realist models, liberal models of 
governance tend to be based in the sovereign-state system. States face similar security 
dilemmas, but are motivated not only by self-interest but also by underlying values of 
life, liberty and property. Richmond (2002) claims that liberalism differs from realism 
mainly in that it chooses cooperative institutions to achieve statist ends within a universal 
normative system. 
Liberals frequently stress the fact that historically, liberal democratic societies 
have not gone to war with each other (Doyle, 1997). Combined with the Enlightenment 
belief that democracy, being based on individual liberty and rationality, produces the 
most effective political system, liberalization is assumed to lead to political stabilization. 
Goodhand (2001) observes that major aid donors in Sri Lanka hold these assumptions. 
This liberal approach posits liberal governance institutions and multilateralism as 
intrinsic to peaceful and prosperous societies. 
Liberal views inform many international conflict resolution initiatives. The 
creation of democratic institutions during processes of nation-building by the United 
Nations appeal to these ideas of stability and prosperity. Rights-based approaches trace 
similar origins, expressing both rights of freedom from coercion and freedom of 
opportunity. Liberal economic systems are also seen as essential to political stability. 
These beliefs are a rationale for institutional support for liberal and neo-liberal economic 
policies. A form of neo-liberal economic policy which has had strong influence on IFIs is 
referred to as the Washington Consensus. It is based on the three pillars of fiscal 
austerity, privatization, and market liberalization (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Critics of multinational nation-building models point to their neo-imperialistic 
character. These critiques are equally aimed at humanitarian initiatives based on liberal 
concepts (Fox, 2001). Liberalism is a millenarian, universalizing discourse with 
European origins. Its prescriptions for development and peace-building in developing 
countries are uniform, regardless of history, geography, resources and demography. In Sri 
Lanka, the linkages between liberal societies, democracy, good governance, and neo- 
liberal economic growth are far from certain (Stokke, 1997). While acts of violence 
accompanying processes of liberal state-building in the country are often described as 
externalities, Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001) points out that, on the contrary, they are 
inherent within state-building processes. 
Radicalism 
The term radicalism is used here to refer to those political theories that have as 
their central value egalitarianism, and as their primary lens of analysis the examination of 
power relations (Clark, 1998). Radicalism can be found at the roots of fields as disparate 
as Marxism, socialism and feminism. Radicalism sees conflict as a constant, natural part 
of human interaction. Drawing on its social activist roots, radicalism seeks to actively 
destabilize dominant and exploitative relations and institutions (Sinha, 2003). 
Recognizing conflict as constant, radicalism looks foremost to the interests of the dis- 
empowered. It finds in systemic conflict opportunity for positive change. Prendergast 
(1996) notes the empowering potential of changing gender roles. Radicalism also 
recognizes that it is the dis-empowered who are the most likely to suffer from violent 
conflict. Miall et al. (1999) note that violence, not conflict is the antithesis of peace. 
Radical views of conflict eschew categories and focus on internal power struggles 
within certain groups. They note the power inherent in the process of defining conflict 
(Bush, 2001a; Slim and Thompson, 1995). This observation can be seen in the 
construction of community identities. Constructed identities both contain internal 
violence, and necessitate exclusion. In his discussion of Muslim identities in Sri Lanka, 
Ismail states that "We know now that racial and ethnic identities are distinctly modern 
constructs, not ancient phenomenon" (1 995: 66). 
Critics of the radical model note its inherently conflictual precepts. Destabilizing 
existing power structures can undermine local institutions in times of conflict. Radical 
approaches attribute less importance to local traditions than to allegiances with groups 
identified as oppressed. In northern Africa, Prendergast (1996) argues that priority should 
be given to local institutions who serve roles of conflict resolution, such as Woreda 
councils in Ethiopia, Chiefs courts in Sudan, or elder's councils in Somalia. The radical 
model would respond that supporting traditional structures effectively takes sides during 
periods of shifting power, supporting what may well be parochial institutions against 
those who have recently found new liberties. Critics contend that these allegiances based 
on values of solidarity and empowerment necessarily demote the primacy of conflict 
resolution. 
Conflict Resolution 
In popular usage, the term conflict resolution refers to attempts to end conflict. 
The expression also refers to a particular school of conflict management. This field 
largely coalesced in the 1970s. It was inspired by the pacifist movements of the 
Mennonites and Quakers, and Gandhian Ahimsa, a philosophy of non-violence. Conflict 
resolution also draws from the fields of social psychology and social anthropology. Miall 
et al. attribute to these fields understandings of how "individual needs come to be 
mediated and articulated through processes of socialization and group identity, 
themselves culturally conditioned" (1999: 73). Conflict resolution is a bottom up 
approach, originating in personal interactions. At root are subjective perceptions, 
emotions and relationships. The field sees reconciliation as its main objective (Lederach, 
1997). 
Conflict resolution theory developed in the 1970s and 1980s has strongly 
influenced current understandings of conflict. Galtung developed the conflict triangle 
which defines three types of violence: direct; structural; and cultural. (Miall et al. 1999). 
He used this to differentiate negative peace (lack of direct violence) from positive peace 
(which includes aspects of social justice). Azar's protracted social conflict theory (PSC) 
examined domestic social roots of conflict and failures of governance (ibid). Of principal 
importance to this theory are questions of identity, individual interests and needs 
mediated through membership in social groups. Needs include security, identity, and 
recognition. 
Critics of conflict resolution question the extent to which the transformation of 
local actors affects large-scale conflict. They suggest that the social theory origins of 
conflict resolution have led to too strong of an emphasis on personal interactions to the 
detriment of structural, political and economic issues. In his study on conflict in Sri 
Lanka, Goodhand notes that "civil society is not a panacea. Pro-war groups such as the 
National Movement against Terrorism, (a Sinhala nationalist organization) are much 
more effective at selling their message than are pro-peace groups" (2001: 40). Critics also 
decry the central role which reconciliation practices accord to outside mediators, when 
"the whole tenor of recent thinking in the field has been towards empowering indigenous 
actors to find the solution that they want and to help them to build capacity to manage 
continuing conflict peacefully in ways of their own devising" (Miall et al. 1999: 223). 
The voices of realist security, neutral humanitarianism, liberal multilateralism, 
and radical change are found in current debates over the appropriate role of aid. The 
consequences of this competition can be severe. One notorious instance of conflict 
between the mandates of neutral humanitarian relief and realist peace-keeping occurred 
during the war in Liberia, when MSF relief trucks were bombed by the regional military 
force ECOMOG. ECOMOG's comment on the incident was that "certain organizations 
have the task of bringing relief to those in need. We have a more important task: 
bringing peace. If relief gets in the way of peacemaking then there will be no relief' 
(Jean cited in Terry 2002: 24). 
Economy of war 
Economic analysis can be made within all the above models of conflict. Three 
areas are of particular concern to this thesis; structural analysis, economic consequences 
and the creation of economies based on war. Structural analysis examines the violence 
produced by economic systems and political structures (Richmond, 2002). Through 
deprivation and exclusion, structural violence frequently causes as much damage as direct 
violence. Structural violence also frequently underlies other forms of conflict (Uvin, 
1998). To address this, substantial systemic reform may be necessary precursors to the 
resolution of established conflicts. As an example, Duffield (2001) argues that continued 
development aid to the Dinka people of Sudan will never be effective as long as they are 
trapped in an exploitative political system. Structural analysis implicates aid agencies in 
the propagation of processes of exclusion and privilege (Uvin, 1998). In a similar vein, 
Le Billon (2000) suggests that agencies should move beyond needs-based solutions 
which address symptoms towards solutions geared to comprehensive economic 
protection. These would include steps to reduce vulnerability and to protect rights. 
The economic consequences of violent conflict are a preoccupation of war 
studies. A Carnegie Commission report claims that a conflict-prevention approach by an 
interventionist international community would have saved the world US$ 130 billion in 
the 1990s (cited in Annan, 2002). Conflict is understood from this perspective as a 
negative disruption of normal economic development (Goodhand, 2001). IFIs often see 
their role as maintaining growth despite conflict, minimizing harm to national economies 
(Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001). One means of addressing conflict is to convince 
participants that the economic consequences are too great to continue. Periods of dktente 
can be consolidated if the economic benefits provide a sufficient peace dividend to 
preclude return to combat. 
Conflict transforms economic systems, bringing devastation to some and new 
sources of power to others. Le Billon notes that all wars have both economic winners 
and losers (2000). Maintenance of economic systems can become integral to political and 
social processes maintaining the conflict. Perpetuation of war can become an end in and 
of itself. Greed is often argued to be more important than inequality as a determinant of 
conflict (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 200 1 ; Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). While some analysts 
debate the importance of greed as a motivator in conflict (Collier et al. 2003), a recent 
Humanitarian Policy Group (2003) makes the observation that relations between 
economic agendas and political power are more subtle than motivations described in 
debates over the relative importance of greed or grievance. 
Critiques note that economy of war models overemphasize economic motivators 
and underemphasize other ways by which people become dedicated to military causes, 
such as nationalism. Several motivators are apparent amongst the LTTE's leadership. The 
LTTE's effectiveness as a military force has increased their support amongst parts of the 
Tamil diaspora, leading to strong international financial support. Although the scale of 
international funding from the Tamil diaspora is difficult to measure with certainty, a WB 
report ventures that during the 1990s this support amounted to around $US 450 million 
annually (Collier et al. 2003). LTTE motivations are more profound than this, however. 
Prabakharan has spent his entire life at war, personally assassinating the mayor of Jaffna 
in 1975. He has great personal investment in the creation of an autonomous Tamil 
government in the north and east. In his analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka, Goodhand 
makes a useful distinction between the "interests" of a political economy and an "emotive 
economy of violence" (200 1 : 37). 
Theories and strategies 
Table One outlines some of the peace-building strategies pursued in Sri Lanka, 
relating them to the political ideologies outlined above. The table highlights that certain 
strategies span several ideologies. Two of these strategies, support for the peace dividend 
and attempts at strengthening civil society organizations, are principal peace-building 
approaches of international aid agencies in Sri Lanka. With the exception of efforts to 
curtail international funding to the LTTE from the Tamil diaspora, measures to decrease 
economic war incentives have received less attention. 
Table 1 Peace-Building Strategies Categorized by Ideology 
Goal 
Economic 
Strategies 
Social and 
Political 
Strategies 
Realist 
No war 
OPeace dividend: 
'buying' antagonists 
ODecrease war 
incentives 
OConditional loans 
0 Peace keeping 
OTrack- 1 
Negotiations 
UMilitary victory 
Liberal democracy Increased equality 
Liberal Radical 
OCivil society 
strengthening 
q Peace keeping 
UStrategic Peace- 
Building 
UGood governance 
institutions 
OHuman rights 
UFederalist 
solutions 
OPeace dividend: 
stabilizing force 
ODecreased war 
incentives 
OConditional loans 
OIntegration of 
antagonists 
OFree markets 
OCivil society 
strengthening 
OPeace dividend: 
destabilization of 
power structures 
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Theories of how to pursue the same strategies often differ between ideologies. 
Support for the peace dividend offers an example. Liberal theory sees economic 
prosperity as an intrinsically stabilizing force; balanced economic growth is therefore a 
good in and of itself. Realist theory, in contrast, sees the peace dividend as relative to 
other motivations. Protagonists of conflict must be convinced that the economic benefits 
of peace outweigh both security concerns and potential profits from war rents. This 
theory supports arguments that corruption can be a stabilizing political force, to the extent 
that it mollifies protagonists (Le Billon, 2003). 
Different theories of how the peace dividend leads to political stability advocate 
different strategies of wealth distribution. Those who argue that a peace dividend must be 
realized by the larger population, and not just elites, advocate community level 
initiatives. Radical approaches target mothers as program beneficiaries, arguing that this 
tactic decreases the resources diverted to the priorities of male heads of households. Such 
programs can lead to substantial shifting in gender relations both within families and 
within communities. 
These differences in implementation are frequently lost in blanket advocacy of the 
strategy of support for the peace dividend. Instead, disparate and at times mutually 
exclusive initiatives are grouped under a common heading. Similar problems exist for 
other strategies listed in Table One. This lack of conceptual clarity weakens the 
effectiveness of peace-building and conflict-sensitive programming. 
CHAPTER 3 
CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA 
This chapter provides background to the conflict in Sri Lanka and the peace 
process up until the summer of 2004. The chapter starts with an overview of Sri Lanka 
and the origins of conflict at the national level. It then focuses on Sri Lanka's Wanni 
region which is controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This region 
is central to chapter five. Following the conflict overview, the chapter surveys differing 
conflict analyses of the conflict, analyses which play a role in informing conflict- 
sensitive practice. The chapter then examines current peace-building in Sri Lanka, paying 
particular attention to the central role played by International Financial Institutions (IFIs). 
Background 
Sri Lanka is a teardrop-shaped tropical island state of sixty-six thousand square 
kilometres located southeast of the southern tip of India. Its topography ranges from a 
mountainous interior, with a few peaks rising above two thousand metres, to flatlands in 
the north. The country's famous beaches, especially those of the south and of the east, 
are a key attraction for the country's large international tourism industry. Two distinct 
monsoon seasons on either side of the island are offset by four months. 
Sri Lanka's long and colourful history blends seamlessly with mythological 
accounts of historical origins and battles. The Sri Lanka Tourist Board (2004) has 
numerous tales from which it picks in projecting the image of the island abroad. In the 
Hindu epic Ramayana, Lanka was the battleground between Ram and the demon Ravana. 
The remains of the bridge of islands built by the faithful monkey god Hanuman are still 
in evidence linking Sri Lanka with India. Buddha is said to have visited the island three 
times, and there is contest over which deity left his footprint on the summit of Adam's 
peak. Marco Polo is said to have described the island as the most perfect island of its size 
in the world. 
These and other myths tie directly into the conflict in Sri Lanka today, as they 
inform nationalist identities, and infuse space with feelings of historical primacy. Modem 
written histories depict the ancient capitals of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa as 
Sinhalese bastions against foreign invasion, and find in King Dutugemunu an early 
champion of Sri Lankan nationalism (Uyangoda, 1998; Jeganathan, 1995). The power of 
such myths to shape perceptions can be seen in Lonely Planet's popular Sri Lanka guide. 
The history section of this guide omits mentioning Tamils until the period of Sri Lanka's 
independence from Britain. Tamils are defined in the guide's glossary as "A people of 
South Indian origins comprising the largest minority population in Sri Lanka" (Lonely 
Planet, 2003: 295). 
Sri Lanka's history was influenced by trade, migration, and numerous invasions 
between the island and the Indian subcontinent (Seneviratne and Stavropoulou, 1998). 
Both Buddhism and Hinduism have been well established in Sri Lanka for over two 
thousand years. Despite distinct religious communities, Brun notes that before the arrival 
of Portuguese colonists in 1505, language and ethnicity were not primary determinants of 
inclusion or exclusion in existing kingdoms (2003). Throughout its history and despite 
partial occupation by Portuguese, Dutch and British colonists, Sri Lanka's first 
manifestation as a single unified state only occurred after the British conquest of the 
Kandyan kingdom in 1 8 1 5. 
Colonialism transformed the demographics of the island. Plantation agriculture in 
the nineteenth century shifted population and political centres to the south away from the 
northern, Tamil majority lowlands. Christian missionary schools remained centred in the 
northern city of Jaffna, contributing to a proportionately higher percentage of Tamil civil 
servants and academics at the time of independence from Britain in 1948 (ibid). The 
population of Sri Lanka has nearly tripled since independence from Britain in 1948, 
exceeding twenty million people in early 2004. The current population growth rate is 
close to one percent (Universiteit Utrecht, 2003), giving Sri Lanka a more balanced 
demographic pyramid than its neighbours. Beyond statistics such as these, descriptions of 
the demography of Sri Lanka quickly become entangled in the politics of the national 
conflict. The conflict in Sri Lanka is frequently, if not predominantly, described as an 
ethnic conflict (Jayaweera, 2001; O'Sullivan, 2001 and Cohen and Deng, 1998). 
Rajasingham-Senanayake makes the more refined observation that: 
The origins of the armed conflict are complex and an effect of modem 
national-state building, democratization, and uneven development in the 
context of the failure of succeeding governments to recognize the 
multicultural nature of the island's polity and to take adequate measure to 
reflect and protect cultural diversity and cultural minorities (2003a: 1 10). 
In LTTE-controlled areas, the caste system has undergone rapid change following 
its official banishment. The legal suppression of the caste system has not led to its 
complete abandonment, however. It has in many ways gone underground. In an attempt 
to avoid the LTTE ban, dowries for Sri Lankan Tamils are occasionally arranged in India. 
Forced displacement has created further social divisions. Of an estimated eight 
hundred thousand internally displaced people (IDPs) at the time of the ceasefire in 
February 2002, close to half have since returned to their areas of origin (Global IDP 
Project, 2004). Return has slowed since the national elections in April 2004. IDP 
concerns such as personal safety, protection of minority rights, and repossession of land 
remain to be addressed (ibid). Very few displaced Muslims are amongst those who have 
returned. In communities such as Puttalam, which have hosted large numbers of Muslim 
IDPs for over a decade, strong divisions have developed between host and IDP 
communities. These divisions are occasionally catalysts of antagonism and violence 
(Brun, 2003). 
Despite twenty years of conflict, large numbers of displaced people, and 
significant destruction of infrastructure in the north, Sri Lanka's GDP continued to grow 
at an average annual rate of over five percent between 1990 and 2000. This continued 
growth during conflict in the north is a reflection of the profound centre-periphery 
division in Sri Lanka, with most infrastructure and services in the country located in and 
around the capital Colombo in the South. Visually striking differences in standards of 
living and infrastructure are apparent when passing from the South into the erstwhile 
conflict zones in the North and East of the country. The main highway from Jaffna in the 
North to Colombo in the South, a distance of four hundred kilometres, took fourteen 
hours by bus in June 2003 despite substantial recent road improvements. The isolation of 
Colombo from the worst effects of the conflict has been pointed to as one reason why the 
Sri Lankan government has lacked commitment in finding a lasting solution to the war. 
Inter-party fighting between political parties in Colombo is often seen as of greater 
importance to national politicians than is the conflict with the LTTE (Mayer et al. 2003). 
The Sri Lankan economy was managed along a central-command model 
following independence. The year 1977 marked a major shift in policy and Sri Lanka 
swung towards the west both politically and economically (Bastian, 2003). Free market 
reforms came in intermittent bursts over the succeeding years. The United National Front 
(UNF) government in power until 2004 pursued an increasingly aggressive platform of 
economic liberalization. 
Situation in the Wanni 
Figure 3 Northern Sri Lanka 
(Based on University of Texas, 2004) 
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The Wanni region encompasses Mullaittivu, Killinochchi, and parts of Mannar 
and Vavuniya districts on the northern mainland of Sri Lanka. It is bounded to its north 
by Elephant Pass, which divides the mainland from Jaffna Peninsula. The city of 
Vavuniya sits just to its south. The territory encompasses over one thousand two hundred 
square kilometres (Jansz, F). Most of the Wanni is under the direct control of the LTTE, 
and is the largest area which they control. This area includes the cities of Killinochchi 
and Mullaittivu. Driving north along the A-9 highway, the line of military control 
between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) is located at Omantai, just 
north of Vavuniya. This spatial demarcation of control is deceptive, however. Competing 
forms of governance with a myriad of allegiances exist on either side of the frontier. 
While the GoSL maintains government services in Killinochchi, the LTTE has active 
political offices in cities under government control such as Mannar. 
Recent history has been tumultuous for the people of the Wanni. The Wanni was 
a central battleground during the period of Eelarn War 111, from 1995-2002. Upon the 
collapse of the 1995 peace process, the GoSL under President Chandrika Kumaratunga 
launched military operation Riveresa (Gunaratna, 2001). Political rhetoric at the time 
asserted that only military victory could ensure success at peace negotiations. The 
military offensive succeeded in capturing Jaffna city on December 5, 1995, and the rest 
of the Jaffna peninsula early the next year (Brun, 2003). This shifted the centre of 
fighting to the Wanni. In July of 1996, the LTTE launched their counter-offensive 
Ceaseless Waves I (Gunaratna, 2001). Large-scale warfare continued for several years. 
The government captured the town of Killinochchi in 1996, which was recaptured by the 
LTTE in September 1998. The LTTE recaptured Elephant Pass in April 2000, nineteen 
months later. Casualties since 1995, the period known as Eelam war 111, amounted to 
close to half of the total of 65,000 attributed to the war since 1982. Most of these were in 
the north (ibid). 
The GoSL imposed a comprehensive economic blockade of the LTTE-controlled 
Wanni for several years up until January 2002. Even small items such as AA batteries 
and cigarette lighters were confiscated at border crossings due to their potential military 
value (interview 5). Many goods remained available in the Wanni due to smuggling from 
Tamil Nadu and through corrupt sections of the Sri Lankan military. These goods were 
generally available at greatly increased prices, however, and the LTTE military authority 
often monopolized distribution (Ravano, 2001). 
INGOs in the Wami worked in a significantly different context before the end of 
the blockade. Access was limited for people as well as relief supplies. Aid workers 
crossing the line of control regularly had to wait for several hours. According to one 
foreign aid worker, this meant that he would not leave the Wanni for weeks at a time, as 
it was a three-day trip each way from Colombo (interview 5). This person now has an 
apartment in Colombo and commutes home most weekends. 
Due to these difficulties, as well as lower donor interest, many fewer aid 
organizations worked in the Wanni prior to the 2002 cease-fire. In 2000, there were eight 
international NGOs in the entire region, according to an aid worker who worked there at 
the time (interview 6). Program objectives were defined as humanitarian relief activities. 
This has changed significantly since the cease-fire. By May 2003 there were eight INGOs 
with permanent offices in Killinochchi alone. 
The two decades of conflict saw repeated cycles of mass displacement. Eighty 
percent of the population was displaced during the conflict, many people multiple times 
(CARE, 2001). The United Nations refugee agency reports that more than 250,000 
people remained officially registered as displaced people in Sri Lanka's four northern 
provinces as of December 2003 (UNHCR, 2003a). Many more displaced people are not 
able, or choose not, to officially register as such. A significant proportion of the displaced 
people from the Wanni are Muslims who were displaced en masse from northern areas 
under LTTE control in 1990. Very few of these Muslims have been amongst recent 
returnees of displaced people. 
The Wanni remains a region destitute from years of conflict. Differences in the 
standard of living between the Wanni and the rest of the country make a powerful visual 
impact. Vavuniya, the major city just south of the line of control, remains a busy, 
industrialized, traffic-filled centre. Killinochchi on the other hand, the largest town in the 
Wanni, re-opened its first modem style restaurant in the spring of 2003. Killinochchi has 
undergone rapid change since 2002. Before the 2002 cease-fire, Killinochchi was nearly 
deserted. By the summer of 2003 Killinochchi was the seat for numerous government and 
LTTE administrative buildings, as well as for regional offices of INGOs. Yet basic 
infrastructure, even in this urban centre, remains poor. 
The contrast with the rest of the Wanni is even more striking. Immediately upon 
leaving the main A-9 freeway to the east, vehicle traffic becomes infrequent. In 
Puthukkudiyiruppu (PTK) and Mullaittivu, the majority of houses are thatch structures 
fronting on dirt tracks. This includes those houses belonging to high-ranking members of 
the military authority. The noise of a passing motorcycle stands out, as the majority of 
traffic is pedestrians or bicyclists. 
In the summer of 2003, the government of Sri Lanka maintained government 
agent offices in the Wanni through which it ran public services. One of these services was 
the Unified Assistance Scheme, which provided monetary stipends for internally 
displaced people returning to their homes. These government services were not run in 
competition with the LTTE. People interviewed at the Killinochchi government office 
referred openly to their LTTE connections (interviews 7 and 8). The principal mechanism 
for GoSLILTTE coordination of relief and development in the Wanni was the 
Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRIN). This 
body was designed as a short-term structure. This mechanism was never fully functional, 
and its development was curtailed in the fall of 2004 in the anticipated move to a regional 
interim administration. One SIHRIN official noted that the body was never given any true 
authority (discussion 9). The development of SIHRIN was of greater interest in Colombo 
than in the Wanni, as it became the focus of substantial political and academic debate in 
the capital (interview 5). A foreign INGO worker noted that those INGOs which had 
been in the Wanni since before the end of the ceasefire tended to continue meeting at 
monthly gatherings of the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, while newer agencies 
were coordinated through the SIHRIN structure (ibid). 
SIHRIN was intended to be replaced by an interim governmental authority 
arranged between the GoSL and the LTTE. The proposal of such a body, however, was a 
catalyst for the downfall of Prime Minister Wickramasinghe's government. On 
November 4,2003, prior to the signing of an interim administration agreement between 
the LTTE and the GoSL, President Kumaratunga dissolved the parliament controlled by 
the opposition United National Front. President Kumaratunga claimed that the interim 
administration was unconstitutional, and a threat to the security of the Sri Lankan state. 
President Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) went on to form a new 
coalition government with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People's Liberation 
Front) after elections in April 2004. The coalition is called the United People's Freedom 
Alliance (UPFA). The change of government has derailed attempts to achieve a 
cooperative form of administration, as both of these parties were elected on a platform 
criticizing the UNF for having made too many concession to the LTTE. The LTTE, for 
its part, maintains that the creation of an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) is a 
precondition of it reengaging in peace talks. Continued efforts by Norwegian facilitators 
had not succeeded in restarting peace talks by July of 2004. 
This political impasse has led to a reversal of progress in joint coordination of 
development and relief activities. In response, the LTTE has reasserted its unilateral 
control over development agencies working in the Wanni. Tamil Planning and 
Development Secretariat Tamilselvan notified major UN agencies and INGOs at a 
meeting on June 20,2004 that in the future he will be in charge of coordinating 
assistance. While Tamilselvan insists that delays in implementing the ISGA should not 
cause a delay in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, he promotes the ISGA as the 
only effective mechanism to address the needs in the LTTE areas (Peace Secretariat, 
2004). 
Since the Tokyo Conference in 2003, donor terminology has shifted from 
humanitarian assistance to post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives. Both 
of these activities are presented as being in support of the peace process. While 
reconstruction initiatives are presented as directly contributing to the peace dividend, 
development projects focus on strengthening cooperation with local partners (interviews 
10 and 1 1). Rehabilitation and development activities continue in the Wanni despite a 
deterioration in relations between the GoSL and the LTTE, and constraints on donor 
funding due to the lack of an interim funding mechanism. 
Conflict analysis 
Analyses and understandings of root and proximate causes of conflict are of 
central importance to the formulation of conflict-sensitive aid and peace-building 
strategies. Analyses delineate the range of possible responses, influence the type of 
actions considered appropriate, and frame whether or not progress is considered to have 
been achieved. However, conflict analyses are difficult to carry out in a practical manner. 
The number of factors examined by conflict analyses is vast. Causes of the Sri Lankan 
conflict are considered to range from loss of trust in relations between individuals to great 
power politics, and from economic motivators to quests for group identity. 
Few aid organizations, and even fewer individual projects, carry out systematic 
and comprehensive conflict analyses in Sri Lanka. Many agencies rely instead on 
individual experience and understanding of context (interview 12). Specialized agencies 
frequently translate onto the Sri Lankan conflict general theories of conflict with which 
the organization has experience. Ideological frameworks further shape which factors 
identified in conflict analyses are prioritized as of greatest import. Experience based 
interpretation is practiced both by organizations working on community development as 
well as international financial institutions (CARE, 2003b; World Bank, 2003). Despite 
these challenges, conflict analysis remains at the root of conflict-sensitive aid 
programming. Project proposals draw on both theory and experience in describing 
positive impacts of prospective activities. A survey of the most commonly perceived 
roots and origins of Sri Lanka's conflict is therefore necessary. 
As described above, the civil war in Sri Lanka is frequently described in terms of 
competing nationalisms between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Uyangoda (2003a) states that 
Sri Lanka has a double minority complex, in which the Tamils see themselves as a 
minority on the island, and the Sinhalese see themselves as a minority through 
associating Sri Lankan Tamils with the people of Tamil Nadu. This view is supported by 
popular history, which describes conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils dating back 
for centuries (Uyangoda, 1998). 
The most commonly enunciated Sinhalese view of the LTTE is that it is a terrorist 
insurgency against the legitimate Sri Lankan state. Extreme Sinhalese nationalists 
forward a realist analysis of the conflict, portraying Sri Lanka as an historical Sinhalese 
homeland subject to repeated foreign invasions. This view is supported by elements of 
the Buddhist sangha, who see Sri Lanka as the last practitioners of pure Buddhism in the 
world. This conflation of religious and nationalist identities is found in the belief that 
monks are both 'bhumiputra', sons of the soil, and 'buddhaputra', sons of Buddha (Silva 
and Bartholomeusz, 200 1). 
From an LTTE perspective, the conflict is the direct result of historical and 
ongoing chauvinistic majoritarian rule by the Sinhalese. This abuse is symbolized by 
the1 983 pogroms in which several thousand Tamils were killed. The LTTE leadership 
has made the realist claim that only an independent state can guarantee the security of 
Tamils. Grandiose visions of a 'Greater Eelam' encompassing parts of Tamil Nadu in 
India, are no longer commonly espoused. 
Figure 4 Concrete Map of Proposed Tamil Eelam 
Located North of Omantai in the Wanni 
(June 23,2003) 
Tensions focused along ethnic lines played an important role in the development 
of the war. In post-independence elections, a series of increasingly nationalistic 
Sinhalese governments came to power. These governments pursued discriminatory 
policies such as at the imposition of Sinhala as the only official language (1 972-1 977), 
and imposed quotas for Tamil students at universities. Rapid population increase in the 
period after independence ensured that control of land was a central point of tension. The 
government also financed settlement campaigns, such as the Mahaweli Project of the late 
1970s, on land in predominantly Tamil areas for settlers from the more heavily populated 
south. These policies contributed to a rapid deterioration of relations between Tamils and 
Sinhalese (Thangarajah, 2003; 0' Sullivan, 200 1; Seneviratne and Stavropoulou, 1998). 
Armed opposition to the central government by Tamil groups started in the mid- 
1970s. The government's response included imposing the harsh Prevention of Terrorism 
Act in 1979. Violent conflict increased following the 1983 anti-Tamil pogroms, and 
further escalated during a brief and bloody intervention by the Indian army between 1986 
and 1989. 
There is strong disagreement over the ethnic lens of analysis. Rajasingharn- 
Senanayake (200 1) notes that "Fundamentally modem, organized, institutionalized 
violence is overlooked in an ethnic-religious-linguistic analysis". Over time, violence 
has become a normalized political instrument in Sri Lanka (Brun, 2003; Goodhand, 
2001). Violent suppression of dissent in Sri Lanka is not limited to the Tamils. Sri Lanka 
has experienced two uprisings by the JVP, in 1971 and again in 1988. These were 
brutally suppressed. The number of people killed in two years during the latter of these 
two uprisings is comparable to the number of casualties over twenty years of conflict 
between the government and the LTTE (Gunaratna, 2001). A parallel exists between the 
JVP and LTTE conflicts in sources of alienation caused by Sri Lanka's weak 
governmental institutions, history of unequal development and wealth distribution, and 
patterns of poverty. Goodhand states that "the Sinhalisation of the state is a manifestation 
of a deeper problem of the failure of the state to institutionalize democratic politics" 
(2001 : 32). These analyses suggest peace-building strategies such as liberal governance 
reform and local empowerment initiatives to resist structural violence. 
Violence in Sri Lanka has taken on an internal logic. The conflict has been 
analysed as both self-perpetuating (Brun, 2003) and institutionalized (Bush, 2002). As 
such, the factors leading to the start of the conflict may no longer be primary motivators. 
Goodhand notes that "Sri Lanka has become a highly militarised society.. . violence has 
become normalised and routinised.. ." (2001: 28). Parallel to this is a breakdown of 
confidence in the police and judicial systems. When faced with community conflict, 
people will turn to a variety of non-state mediators, depending upon whom they trust the 
most (Raheem and Gosselin, 2003). Conflict resolution initiatives strive to strengthen 
these informal mediators (ibid). 
A principal manner by which the conflict has become self-perpetuating is through 
the establishment of economies of war. By 2001, war spending accounted for forty 
percent of the government budget (Uyangoda, 2003a) In regions of the rural south, the 
army has become a primary employer. Widespread corruption within the military and the 
government have led to profitable largesse related to military procurement. Elements of 
the Sri Lankan military even profited from trading prohibited items with the LTTE during 
the economic embargo of the north which lasted until January 2002. Corruption leads to 
increased inter-group tensions in Sri Lanka due to lack of equitable access to resources, 
as well as further undermining democratic institutions of government. 
The LTTE economy is even more strongly linked to the conflict. The scale of 
international funding from the Tamil diaspora is difficult to know with any certainty, with 
outside estimates ranging to over ninety percent of the organization's funds (Chalk, 
2001), The organization has a well-organized and dedicated following in its diaspora 
communities throughout the world. The largest of these communities is in Toronto, 
Canada (Cheran, forthcoming). 
The LTTE also profit through their control over territory. The LTTE maintain 
power in the areas under their control both through the use of coercion and through the 
legitimacy they gain in their perceived role as protectors of the Tamil people. The LTTE 
operates a parallel government structure and taxation system not only in areas which it 
directly controls, such as the Wanni, but in other areas of the North and East in which it 
has influence. This legitimacy is dependent upon the continuation of a military threat. 
The LTTE has consolidated its position as the dominant insurgent group 
representing the Tamils by the use of brutal, repressive tactics against both the 
government and competing Tamil resistance organizations since the 1970s. Absolute 
control by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan remains characteristic of the organization 
today (Bush, 2002). The LTTE has repeatedly confronted the much larger Sri Lankan 
military successfully, and is famous for tactics such as frequent political assassinations, 
suicide bombings by the 'Black Tiger' brigade, and deploying high numbers of female 
cadres in combat roles (Gunaratna, 2001). 
The Sri Lankan war economy has international dimensions. Sri Lanka has become 
an important consumer of arms and military services, purchasing from countries such as 
Israel. The LTTE has established trading relationships with insurgent groups in various 
countries, including the Abu Sayyaf of the Philippines. The LTTE operates a fleet of 
merchant ships through which it facilitates its international trade and arms smuggling 
(Goodhand, 2001). 
Peace process or pause in conflict? 
The current peace-process mediated by Norwegian negotiators started with a 
cease-fire between the government and the LTTE in February 2002. Direct talks between 
the protagonists were suspended in April 2003, and to date have not resumed. No peace 
treaty has been signed, nor have any constitutional changes which would be part of such a 
treaty been proposed at the level of the Sri Lankan government. Strong pressure within 
both the Tamil and Sinhalese political structures and from the international donor and 
diplomatic community encouraged the start of the peace-process in 2002. Many of these 
pressures did not exist at the time of the 1995 peace process (Bush, 2002; Perera and 
MacSwiney, 2002). Prime Minister R. Wickramasinghe's government was faced with an 
economy that had gone into recession for the first time since the start of the conflict, 
strongly impacted by the LTTE attack on the international airport in July of 2002. The 
government benefited from the active support of the Sri Lankan military, unlike the SLFP 
in 1995. The LTTE faced financial constraints due to diminishing remittances from the 
Tamil diaspora. They also had to contend with an international political environment 
dominated by an anti-terrorist agenda. For the first time, the LTTE publicly abandoned its 
realist stance and suggested that it might accept a reinterpretation of self-determination to 
mean internal self-determination, not secession (Uyangoda, 2003a). 
The peace-process faced serious obstacles, however. There is considerable 
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scepticism as to the sincerity with which the UPFA government is calling for renewed 
peace talks (Uyangoda, 2004). A central obstacle to the resumption of talks is the form 
and level of autonomy that might be granted an LTTE administration. President 
Kumaratunga cited the proposal by the UNF government of the ISGA with the LTTE as 
the reason she dissolved parliament in the fall of 2003. The SLFP's partners in the 
governing alliance, the JVP, takes an even stronger position against the ceding of any 
power to the LTTE. The defeat of the UNF government in April 2004 can be seen as an 
indication that despite years of war, upon stabilization of the economy the Sinhalese 
majority were not ready to make substantial changes to achieve resolution of the conflict. 
A further obstacle to the resumption of peace talks is division within the LTTE. In 
March 2004, the LTTE Eastern commander Colonel Karuna declared independence from 
the LTTE claiming that the LTTE's Northern-origin leadership exploited Tamils in the 
East of the country. While the secession was quickly suppressed, Karuna escaped to 
Colombo with the assistance of the Sri Lankan government. Karuna's continued presence 
in Colombo is a central complaint of the LTTE. The GoSL officially denies harbouring 
Karuna. During the summer of 2004, there were regular assassinations between partisans 
of the LTTE and Karuna's faction (Perera, 2004a). The LTTE also continued to 
assassinate non-LTTE Tamils with impunity. More than one hundred twenty members of 
the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EDPD), a Tamil party which opposes the LTTE, 
were assassinated since the 2002 cease-fire (ibid). 
Increased pressure for peace-building 
Despite the recent deterioration in the political context, aid donors in Sri Lanka 
remain under pressure to adopt programming strategies in support of the country's move 
towards peace. Proactively engaging with the national conflict is a recent development 
for most of Sri Lanka' major donors. Previously, donors looked at the conflict as a 
negative impact on the development process, interpreting the effects of the war on Sri 
Lanka's social and economic development as a negative externality. Goodhand (2001) 
described this as working around the conflict. By 2003, donors had accepted this 
criticism and were making efforts at change (interview 3). The four and a half billion 
dollars pledged at the Tokyo Donor Conference, an unprecedented level of aid, was 
declared to be conditional upon progress in the peace process (Relief Web, 2003; 
interviews 2 and 13). The use of aid conditionalities in support of peace-processes has 
become an increasingly common tactic of both bilateral donors and IFIs in recent years 
(Boyce, 2002). 
Changing donor priorities in Sri Lanka have led to both a proliferation of peace- 
building initiatives and to greater stress on conflict-sensitive aspects of relief and 
development practices. Initiatives described as conflict-sensitive or peace-building cover 
a spectrum of strategies including community-level reconciliation programs, 
rehabilitation efforts, and support for medium and long-term national structural 
adjustment programs. While some agencies have made substantial investments in 
developing new capacities, both Sri Lankan and foreign aid agencies with little or no 
previous experience in the field of peace-building and conflict-sensitive aid programming 
now compete as experts in this new donor market. Peace-building and related 
terminology have become so widespread that practitioners express considerable 
scepticism at the sincerity and effectiveness with which many agencies have adopted new 
practices (Harris, 2002; interview 12). 
The peace dividend and international financial institutions as agenda 
setters 
The IFIs have clearly chosen the peace dividend as their primary form of support 
for the peace process in Sri Lanka. Support for the peace dividend is a strategy which 
entails convincing combatants and their supporters that the material benefits of peace 
outweigh the possible benefits of returning to war. During a visit to Sri Lanka in early 
2003 Mr. Chino, president of the ADB, noted that "In the north, people are anxiously 
awaiting more tangible peace dividends as soon as possible" (Asian Development Bank, 
2003: 1). The importance of the peace dividend was stressed by ADB officials as "the 
main conflict sensitive approach" of the ADB, and as "necessary to increase the appetite 
for peace" (interviews 14 and 15). 
While donors see the promotion of liberal governance as a long-term, structural 
approach to ameliorating conflict, the peace dividend is understood as a short-term, 
urgent and context specific strategy linked to the current peace process. Promotion of a 
peace dividend has become accepted amongst international donors and INGOs as a 
primary funding strategy in support of the peace process, especially for LTTE-controlled 
areas such as the Wanni. As with the well-digging program mentioned above, 
development programs which would not be considered as viable under their own logic 
are accepted with lower standards when presented in the form of a dividend. The reason 
for the predominance of this approach has a lot to do with the dominant role of the 
International Financial Institutions. Together with Japanese foreign assistance, IFIs 
account for eighty-five percent of all development funding to Sri Lanka (Goodhand, 
2001). Their influence is even greater than this proportion would suggest. IFIs work 
closely with the GoSL in setting its economic and social policy agendas. In tandem with 
its more direct engagement with conflict starting in the 1990s, the WB has internationally 
taken on a more central role as a coordinator of aid (Harmer, 2004). While bilateral 
agencies do not necessarily accept their lead, IFIs often assume the role of coordinators 
of overall official development assistance (ODA) to Sri Lanka. 
There are three main IFIs in Sri Lanka. These are the Asian Development Bank, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To these can be added the 
Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC). The JBIC is a bilateral hnding agency 
with a larger ODA portfolio than any of the IFIs. As a bilateral agency, domestic 
Japanese political concerns influence its activities (interview 3). In programming, 
ideology and association, however, it resembles the IFIs. A deputy of the JBIC in Sri 
Lanka described JBIC's loan structuring as "very similar to other multilateral donors like 
the World Bank or ADB" (interview 2). 
The agenda-setting role of the IFIs in national level aid policy can be seen in the 
World Bank's poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) created as a framework for ODA 
(World Bank, 2003). The Sri Lankan PRSP plan is portrayed as having been developed 
by the Sri Lankan government, and merely coordinated by the WB and IMF. This process 
integrates the priorities of these IFIs into national policy. A North-South Institute report 
states that the PRSP scheme "re-orders the donor consultation process, assigning United 
Nation and bilateral donors the role of stake-holders in a country managed consultation, 
which the WB and IMF oversee. The shift consolidates the WB's and IMF's leadership 
role, a shift which other donors question and appear to resist" (Nelson, 2002: 2). 
As multilateral agencies mandated to promote economic growth through 
structural reform, IFIs are intrinsically liberal institutions. Their approach to structural 
reforms have often contributed to centralization of power and strengthening of 
exclusionary governance institutions (Stiglitz, 2002). This has left them open to radical 
critiques. The PRSP framework was developed partially in response to pressure to make 
the IFIs more transparent and participatory. The IFIs are frequently criticized as applying 
standardized economic solutions regardless of situations in the countries where they work 
(ibid). 
The degree to which nationally formulated PRSPs reflect standard IF1 practice 
demonstrates the degree of influence that IFIs have. Nelson notes that "The paradoxical 
concept of "ownership" means that governments use a WB-mandated participatory 
process to develop a national plan that implements international anti-poverty objectives" 
(2002: 2). It is clear that the PRSP process in Sri Lanka did not entail open and 
meaningful public engagement. The Alliance for the Protection of Natural Resources and 
Human Rights in Sri Lanka, a civil society umbrella group, stated that "Contrary to the 
Fund and Bank's stated commitment to principles of country ownership and participation 
that are supposed to guide the PRSP process, this document was written to mirror the 
Fund and Bank's policy recommendations for Sri Lanka, without any consultative 
process with Sri Lankan civil society" (50 years, 2003: 1). 
The development of the PRSP framework is an indication of the influence of the 
IFIs on the peace process at the national political level. Scale offers potential leverage of 
the type which smaller donors don't have. Scale is also a factor in how the IFIs approach 
conflict sensitive programming specific to the Wanni. The large number of initiatives 
which the IFIs fund make it more practical for the organizations to look at institution- 
wide policies and practices, rather than micro-level impacts. One WB official interviewed 
stated that it was more important for the bank to craft the conflict impact of its overall 
portfolio than to study the conflict impacts of specific projects (interview 13). 
The strategies of the IFIs in Sri Lanka are also determined by their institutional 
structures. As multilateral donors, IF1 assistance is principally in the form of 
concessionary loans to the GoSL. These means that IFIs do not directly engage at the 
project implementation level. As such, they are a blunt tool for local level influence, 
particularly in the Wanni. IFIs also have less flexibility in their procedural rules than 
bilateral agencies. This further affects their ability to cooperate with the LTTE. One ADB 
official noted how the bank has been unable to award contracts in its work with the 
LTTE, as the bank was required to offer contracts to true public tender, something the 
LTTE would not allow. As a result, the project was on hold (interview 14). The mandates 
of IFIs, as well as their responsiveness to international geopolitical pressures (Boyce, 
2002), ensure that they will remain engaged in Sri Lanka whether the conflict resumes or 
not. While the WB has increasingly decentralized over the last decade, its framework for 
engagement in countries in conflict centres growth and rehabilitation as primary 
strategies of conflict resolution, and promotes the initiation of reconstruction activities 
"as soon as field conditions 'allow"' (Harmer, 2004: 33). 
Goodhand's description of the IFIs as working 'around' the conflict referred to 
agencies that "rarely take conflict into account to any significant extent or they treat it as 
a 'disruptive factor' to be avoided" (2001: 67). This has changed to the extent that IFIs 
now generally recognize the importance of working on the conflict and have several 
initiatives in this direction. The profundity of these changes remains untested, however. 
The changing funding strategies of the IFIs in Sri Lanka are related as much to the 
different political context as they are to evolving approaches of the institutions. The two 
can be difficult to differentiate. Organizations often point to expansion of their activities 
into the north as examples of profound organizational change. Several officials were 
unable to answer how things would be different if there were to be a return to the conflict, 
however. Citing safety of staff, one JBIC official stated that the agency would not be able 
to continue operating in the north if there was a return to active conflict (interview 2). An 
official at the WB felt that a return to war was so unlikely that the bank did not need to 
seriously examine that possibility in its current planning (interview 13). 
CHAPTER 4 
PRACTICE UNDER PRESSURE 
SUPPORTING THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE WANNI 
International aid agencies operating in the Wanni in the summer of 2003 primarily 
interpreted conflict-sensitive programming as local and regional level support for the 
national peace process. This chapter examines the conflict-sensitive strategies used by 
donor agencies and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the Wanni 
in the summer of 2003. As noted in the introduction, the peace process as used here does 
not refer exclusively to formal negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), known as track one 
negotiations. The process by which Sri Lanka may move away from a period of violent 
conflict includes broad changes in societal attitudes and social and political institutions. 
As with other forms of conflict-sensitive programming, support for the peace process is 
not a formal objective of most aid initiatives. Instead, aid to the Wanni is carried out 
under the rubric of rehabilitation and development. 
This chapter looks at two main strategies for supporting the peace process: civil 
society capacity building and support for the peace dividend. The chapter will examine 
the challenges that each of these strategies currently faces. These include both political 
pressures and institutional structures that shape donor and aid agency decision-making 
processes. 
To catch a fish 
The re-opening of the A-9 highway to commercial and private traffic in early 
2002 is frequently said to be the north's most important peace dividend from the current 
peace process in Sri Lanka (Sunday Leader, 2002). Most goods in the Wanni became 
cheaper and more available as a result. The price of fish, however, increased substantially 
on local markets. Previous to the period of blockade, during which a government military 
cordon blocked the majority of material goods from entering or leaving LTTE-controlled 
areas, fish were an important export item from the Wanni to Colombo and tourist markets 
in the south. With the re-opening of the border, shipments have resumed, driving up 
local prices. Sri Lankan and international agencies such as the Sri Lankan Red Cross and 
ECHO have taken the initiative to reinvigorate the fishing industry, largely by means of 
organizing fishing cooperatives and supplying necessary credit and equipment (interview 
5). 
In June 2003, I attended a meeting in a coastal village near Puthukkudiyiruppu 
(PTK) between an INGO, its local non-governmental organization (LNGO) partner, and 
beneficiaries of their joint program. The purpose of the meeting was to decide the 
composition of fishing kits to be distributed. Also present at the meeting were two cadres 
of the Sea Tigers, the naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. One of the sea 
tigers informally chaired the proceedings, opening the event with a minute of silence and 
closing with a pledge of naval support for all fishing activities. 
The meeting clearly demonstrated the central coordinating role of the LTTE over 
community level development work by international aid agencies in the Wanni. This 
echoes the findings of other researchers in the Wanni (de Alwis and Hyndman, 2002). It 
calls into question the success with which INGOs in the Wanni were practicing conflict 
resolution approaches such as capacity-building and projects involving substantive and 
genuine community participation. It further raised questions as to the political neutrality 
of INGOs, their legitimization of LTTE authority, and the degree of their insertion in the 
war economy. 
In the LTTE-controlled Wanni, international agencies largely interpret conflict- 
sensitive programming as being support for and consolidation of the peace process at the 
local level. They have followed two main strategies: support of community capacity- 
building initiativeslcivil society strengthening programs and support for the peace 
dividend. Support for community capacity-building and civil society development are not 
just a strategic tactic of donors; local empowerment and participatory management are 
central to the mandates and organizational cultures of many of the development 
organizations which implement them. The LTTE's control over community-based 
organizations undermines the validity and effectiveness of these types of programs. 
While there has been a substantial increase in community development programs in the 
Wanni since the February 2002 cease-fire between the GoSL and the LTTE, lack of 
political freedom for these programs due to intimidation from authoritarian LTTE 
officials continues to frustrate attempts by international agencies to foster truly 
independent civil society organizations. 
These frustrations challenge the mandates of many international development 
organizations working in the Wanni. Nonetheless, there has been little substantial shift in 
programming. Several of the reasons for this are directly related to donor support for Sri 
Lanka's peace process. Donor focus on the peace process has induced a repackaging of 
ongoing programs as peace-building activities. The large funds pledged by international 
donors in support of the peace process have put supply side (as opposed to needs based) 
pressure on development agencies to run programs in the Wanni. The manner in which 
the LTTE has coordinated aid has also facilitated engagement by aid agencies. LTTE 
control over community-level development programming has been both well coordinated 
and structured in a way that nominally satisfies successful outcome indicators set by 
donors. In addition, the rapidly evolving political situation in Sri Lanka has allowed 
agencies to hope that greater permissiveness of liberal reform may appear in the LTTE 
political structure in the future, justifying short-term engagements which do not satisfy 
normal criteria (interview 5). 
Civil society and community empowerment 
Development agencies' community empowerment initiatives are designed to 
support independent, participatory local organizations in playing greater roles in 
community life, strengthening resilience in the face of ambivalent or reactionary 
authority. The approach envisions civil society as a counterbalance to state power. The 
lack of a resilient civil society is of particular concern in the Wanni. During the twenty 
years of conflict, many Tamil civil society structures, particularly those involved in social 
activism and conflict mediation, have been significantly weakened or destroyed (Raheem 
and Gosselin, 2003). 
The development of functional civil society organizations is also important in the 
Wanni given Sri Lanka's historical lack of effective local governance institutions 
(Wanasinghe, 2003). The government of Sri Lanka has undergone a process of 
centralization since independence. This change has left local governance institutions 
weak and unable to respond to local conflict situations. Instead, responses to local 
conflicts tend to come from the national political level. In the Wanni, centralized control 
by the GoSL has been replaced by even more centralized control by the LTTE. Through 
this political structure, local conflicts are given larger meaning within the national 
political process (ibid). 
There are differing models of how civil society capacity building can contribute to 
peace-building. Conflict resolution models see civil society as a vehicle to address local 
tensions without requiring redress to government institutions which may be biased, lack 
legitimacy, or focused on national issues. Radical views of conflict stress that many root 
causes of conflict cannot be addressed at the national level of politics. This is especially 
true in LTTE controlled areas. Without dismissing the necessity of macro-level political 
solutions, cessation of combat may not prove durable if issues such as economic 
exclusion and exploitative power relations are not addressed. Issues of human rights and 
social justice can be addressed by a civil society that has sufficient political space and 
fieedom from fear to agitate (Bauer, Bigdon and Korf, 2003). 
Many of the INGOs working in the Wanni are committed to radical, comrnunity- 
based approaches. This is clearly underlined in organization documents. A CARE 
document outlining their activities in Sri Lanka states that: 
Marginalization or exclusion of certain groups has been a factor in much 
of the social unrest.. . building social cohesion is an underlying goal of all 
of CARE'S projects and is fundamental to our entire Country Program 
strategy. At the community level, projects involve as broad a range of 
community members and community-based organizations as possible 
(2003: 1). 
FORUT, another INGO working in the Wanni, reports that "The Mission of 
FORUT Sri Lanka is to strive to improve the living conditions of the people by acting as 
a catalyst in building up and strengthening local groups1 organizations" (2001 : cover). 
The degree to which these organizations have managed to successfully pursue these 
agendas is different in the Wanni from other parts of Sri Lanka. 
The LTTE in control 
The current focus on peace-building activities by international donors in Sri 
Lanka has increased attention on the conflict resolution aspects of village-level 
development work. There has not, however, been substantial change in the conditions 
necessary for them to flourish. Projects aimed at strengthening civil society as a form of 
community empowerment lack the degree of political freedom required to operate in a 
meaningful manner. The LTTE has successfully consolidated most forms of political 
power in the Wanni. Consolidation of political control by the LTTE in the Wanni extends 
to the social level as well. The LTTE has actively tried to shape social transformation 
during the conflict. A central area of engagement is over Tamil identity and history, 
which are fundamental in creating a popular perception of the war as a struggle for 
independence from oppression (De Silva, 1995; Wilson, 2000.). The LTTE has, with 
varying degrees of success, banished the caste system and challenged conventional 
gender roles through extensive participation of women cadres in combat. One manner by 
which the LTTE popularizes its versions of historical events is through videos of major 
LTTE combat victories, made with hand-held cameras and available throughout the 
Wanni. 
The weakness of existing civil society structures in the Wanni complicates the 
work of development organizations. The challenge is all the more profound due to the 
highly effective system of control which the LTTE has implemented over international 
relief and development organizations themselves. The political office directly assigned to 
coordinate international NGOs is the Tamil Planning and Development Secretariat. 
International agencies also frequently implement directly through, or in conjunction with, 
the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). UNICEF, for example, runs a large child- 
soldier rehabilitation program in cooperation with the TRO. The TRO retains nominal 
independence from the LTTE. This independence allows the TRO to work with 
international agencies that are banned from working directly with the LTTE due to the 
latter's status as a terrorist organization in several countries. 
Another form of LTTE control over INGOs is through spatial regimentation. The 
Wanni is divided up by village, and different international agencies are assigned to 
specific villages. Agencies are frequently responsible for all relief and rehabilitation 
activities in the villages to which they are assigned, regardless of the mandate of the 
agency. Not surprisingly, this leads to different types and qualities of programs being run 
between neighbouring villages. Two programs supplying fishing kits in villages near 
Mullaittivu illustrate this point. One program offered kits free of charge, whereas the 
second village was offered material as part of a micro-credit program (interview 5). 
International agencies are required to work in cooperation with local village 
NGOs. As smaller villages typically have only one local NGO, the allocation of a village 
is also the designation of a partner NGO. Village NGOs are not truly independent, 
however. A regional representative for an international NGO in the Wanni noted that the 
main reason most local NGO partners can claim to be 'non-governmental' is that the 
LTTE is not an official government (interview 10). Employees of these organizations are 
at times chosen for, or transferred between, local NGOs by the TRO. The TRO pays 
salaries in some of these organizations. Through this system, local NGOs represent an 
extension of LTTE political control. 
By requiring that development agencies cooperate with local organizations which 
are presented as independent, the structure of political control in the Wanni nominally 
fulfills project requirements for local partner participation. Time pressures from donor 
agencies further encourage participation in the structure. Donor commitments are 
commonly based on one-year cycles. To increase pressure on these short cycles, one 
LTTE tactic has been to introduce a series of delays early in the project cycle, forcing 
implementation to be completed in a rush to meet deadlines (interview 5). 
By co-opting local capacity-building efforts of international agencies, LTTE 
control over aid programs in the Wanni calls into question the validity of participatory 
processes. Attempts to follow a community empowerment agenda independent of local 
authority quickly run into problems in the LTTE-controlled Wanni. De Alwis and 
Hyndman (2002) note that even standard development practices such as participatory 
rural appraisals and rehabilitation of schools can lead to negative outcomes, as personal 
information from such appraisals can fall into the hands of the LTTE, and that "entire 
classes of students have disappeared to serve as LTTE cadres under the leadership of 
their teachers" (2002: 9). Development projects aimed at strengthening civil society are 
not new to the region. The LTTE is well aware of the human rights and social justice 
agendas that international development agencies support and the techniques which they 
employ to advance them. They are equally aware of the challenge represented by 
conflict-resolution structures which they do not control. Attempts by development 
agencies to form truly independent reconciliation processes are actively frustrated. In one 
example in the spring of 2003, after a UN agency conducted independent community 
mobilization exercises to form peace awareness groups, the sole participant to show up at 
the subsequent meetings was a representative of the LTTE's political wing (interview 
10). The LTTE's ability to control information-gathering in the Wanni is clear. 
A question ofpolitical space 
While the LTTEYs tructure of controlling aid to the Wanni for its own ends is 
both effective and well coordinated, the organization is not as monolithic as popular 
imagery suggests. International development agencies running projects in the Wanni 
continue to debate how much political freedom exists to run community-level capacity- 
building programming. While the March 2004 split within the LTTE led by Colonel 
Karuna was quickly suppressed, it is an indication of regional differences within the 
LTTE. There is variation between districts both in degree and structure of political 
control and in approaches practiced by local authorities. 
Recognizing the difficulties with establishing new, independent community-based 
civil society organizations, international agencies pursuing capacity-building strategies 
find two potential approaches. The first of these is through the existing local NGO 
structure. While the LTTE may be ultimately in charge, the motivations and impacts of 
individuals working for local NGOs should not be dismissed. Through personal 
relationships, cooperation on development projects with international agencies, and 
cross-over in staff between local and international structures, approaches of local NGOs 
evolve over time. Personal contact is important; people working for local NGOs often 
play a variety of leadership roles in the community beyond their official duties. 
Opportunity can also be seen in the LTTE's current process of structural 
transformation. During the current cease-fire the LTTE has been expanding its civil- 
governance role. This means that people in new positions of authority are establishing 
new institutions and learning new forms of governance. Programs taking aim at these 
opportunities include non-confrontational training in rights-based approaches and study 
tours of LTTE authorities examining liberal forms of governance elsewhere (Perera, 
2004b). Perera notes that LTTE administrators are "being provided with educational 
opportunities within the Wanni that subscribe to the basic norms of academic freedom 
without censorship." He further sees a role for teachers to "deepen and widen this 
commitment so that it does not stay at the level of mere tokenism" (ibid: 1). 
Such initiatives are attempts to transform the LTTE's rigid authoritarian structure, 
without challenging the structure itself. These opportunities remain the exception rather 
than the rule. Autonomy is often lacking at the level of community-based organizations, 
and even door-to-door needs assessments reveal pre-determined answers. One 
development agency in the Wanni tried to get around this obstacle by arriving at a pre- 
arranged assessment with numerous staff who then quickly scattered throughout the 
village to conduct informal interviews (interview 10). This novel tactic was not 
sustainable, however, as it relied upon the factor of surprise. 
At times local NGOs have antagonistic relations with the communities which they 
purportedly represent. A 2003 report called Informal Dispute Resolution in the Northeast 
and Puttalam presents the following description: 
... the villagers that did speak to the field workers ... were apprehensive 
about talking about how the local NGO functioned, what they felt about it 
or the problems and disputes they faced. Any criticism of the local NGO 
was made out of earshot of other villagers. The villagers who did speak to 
the researchers told them that when they left the village, the members of 
the local NGO and local LTTE leaders would be informed and would visit 
the village to make an inquiry (Raheem and Gosselin, 2003: 1 13). 
Agencies striving to implement community-level capacity-building initiatives in 
the Wanni have more than issues of independence from the LTTE to worry about. 
Agencies must also bear in mind that civil society structures are not always beneficent 
forces in conflict areas. Strong civil society organizations, including Sinhala nationalist 
groups in the south of Sri Lanka, seek to actively spoil the peace process. Independent 
civil society structures fostered through international development programs do not 
necessarily become agents of peace and stability. 
Peace dividend 
All projects in the Wanni, including those aimed at community level civil society 
organizations, have economic spin-offs. As such, they also fall under the second principal 
funding strategy of large institutional donors in support of the peace process in Sri Lanka, 
promotion of a peace dividend. Substantial improvement in standards of living and 
economic opportunities will, it is argued, decrease the likelihood of people returning to 
war (Krishnan, 2002).As with most types of economic policy, there is disagreement over 
the best way to achieve this goal. Strategies range from implementing a series of quick 
impact projects with immediate material benefits to macro-economic policies designed to 
maximize Sri Lanka's national economic growth rate (interview 13). 
As outlined in chapter two, theories on how the peace dividend contributes to 
peace vary between ideological positions. Resultant strategies have not been adopted 
equally across the island. The rehabilitation of the Wanni, site of the majority of the 
fighting during the war and containing most of the LTTE territory, has entailed rapid, 
high-visibility infrastructure projects. Aside from the opening of the A-9 and some water 
tank rehabilitation, these projects have largely included construction of infrastructure 
indirectly tied to livelihoods, such as wells and school buildings. Large-scale projects 
funded through the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), however, have remained 
largely in the south. Due to the IF17s multinational structure, structural adjustment 
initiatives are targeted at the GoSL. 
Despite the stated importance of fostering a peace dividend, this goal is rarely 
made explicit in formal program objectives. While projects are frequently promoted due 
to the positive impact that they will have upon the peace dividend, this impact is 
nonetheless understood as a secondary effect of projects with different explicit objectives. 
For example, a well-digging program in the Wanni in the summer of 2003 was run with 
relaxed implementation criteria as a quick impact project. The project's indicators of 
success remained the number of wells dug. Impacts on community well-being or 
perceptions were not examined (interview 5).  
Effective methodologies for measuring the impacts of peace dividend spending 
have not been developed (Smith, 2004). This is complicated in LTTE occupied parts of 
Sri Lanka by the fact that the GoSL has stopped including the region in national 
economic statistics. These factors leave plenty of room for unsubstantiated claims and 
counter-claims as to the scale to which the peace dividend has been realized. Supporters 
of the strategy point to the resumption of trade between the Wanni and the rest of Sri 
Lanka as having substantial economic benefits for people living in the North. Detractors 
claim that there has not yet been visible improvement in the lives of the majority of 
people living in the Wanni, and furthermore that those advantages which have 
materialized have been due to the work of the local population, not from foreign-funded 
projects. In contrast, donor funds pledged in support of the peace dividend offer very 
clear figures. By defining rehabilitation and development spending as integral to the 
peace process, a wide range of activities can be, and are, described as peace-building 
initiatives. The peace dividend concept allows for large scale, politically visible 
contributions to be described as supporting the peace effort (Asian Development Bank, 
2003). 
International financial institutions, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and the World Bank (WB), have funded rehabilitation and assistance initiatives in the 
Wanni such as the North East Community Restoration Project and the Unified Assistance 
Scheme (ibid). As institutions designed to support state-centric, liberal models of 
governance, international financial institutions have been both hesitant and institutionally 
unable to commit the much larger amounts of money committed at the Tokyo Conference 
towards promoting a peace dividend in the Wanni. As IFIs must negotiate loans with 
national governments, they require clear governmental mechanisms to be responsible for 
funds committed. Such a mechanism has not evolved for the Wanni (interview 14). IFIs 
also face long funding approval processes from their boards. In Sri Lanka's dynamic 
political scenario, this has been a factor precluding major commitments. Attempts by 
international financial institutions to create a mechanism through which to channel funds 
to the North have not been politically neutral. The attempt by the United National Front 
government to establish an interim administration during its tenure is one of the reasons 
leading to President Kumaratunga's dissolution of the government in February 2004 and 
subsequent call for elections. 
Political impacts 
Aid programs in support of the peace dividend are not neutral. They have 
significant economic and political impact in the Wanni. Even assuming that increased 
regional prosperity would lead to a reluctance to return to war, the questions arise as to 
who benefits the most from peace dividend projects, and how important regional 
economic considerations are for the LTTE leadership. The LTTE is a major beneficiary 
of peace dividend initiatives (interview 2). Programs in the Wanni which put large 
resources into infrastructure rehabilitation projects, such as well and latrine construction, 
see significant resources diverted to the regional authorities. Whether increased income 
from aid sources is a significant deterrent to the LTTE from returning to conflict, or if 
instead these funds sponsor a build-up of military capacity during a temporary pause in 
conflict, is unclear. The effects of financial gains for the LTTE on the broader war 
economy is a pressing issue considering the deterioration of relations between the LTTE 
and the new Sri Lankan government. 
Aid agencies do not seem overly concerned with this possibility. As an example, 
when a new thirty percent tax was imposed on cement imports into the Wanni in the 
summer of 2003, there was little protest from donors. The per unit cost for latrine and 
well construction charged to new international NGOs arriving in the Wanni in the 
summer of 2003 by their local NGO partners escalated rapidly (interview 10). Many 
agencies accept such fees as the price they pay for working in LTTE territory (interview 
5). A Colombo-based World Bank administrator stated simply that "the Wanni is a trade- 
off between a peace dividend and losing money to the LTTE" (interview 13). 
Relief and development work in the Wanni supports the LTTE in other ways as 
well. The LTTE7s expanding civil governance role has entailed a changing relationship 
with the Tamil population in the Wanni. As a military force, the LTTE7s principal source 
of legitimacy with Tamil people came from the perception that the LTTE was the only 
successful protector of Tamils from Sinhalese oppression through the Sri Lankan army. 
By establishing effective governance and claiming ownership of the reconstruction 
process of the Wanni, the LTTE has sought new sources of legitimacy (Perera, 2004). 
Through the supply of resources and publicly visible cooperation, international aid is 
collusive in this process. Tamilselvan7s June 2004 coordination meeting of major aid 
agencies in the Wanni is an example of the LTTE media's efficiency at publicizing 
meetings between foreign donors and regime officials (Peace Secretariat, 2004). 
Recognizing negative impacts of projects does not negate the importance of 
continued programming in the Wanni. As discussed in chapter three, the level of 
destruction caused by the war is readily apparent upon crossing the line of control. The 
Wanni remains the most war-devastated region of Sri Lanka. Needs-based assessments 
clearly indicate a role for relief and development organizations. Organizations face strong 
pressures to operate in the Wanni beyond .the benefits of their programs, however. One 
reason is the concern of organizations to maintain the appearance of neutrality by 
offering programs in both the LTTE and government-controlled areas. Increased funding 
opportunities in the Wanni are also an important draw factor as organizations follow 
donor priorities. Even when awarding projects in the south, donors striving for balanced 
targeting of aid look more favourably upon organizations with a presence in the LTTE- 
occupied regions. 
Due to the perceived danger of operating in LTTE controlled areas as well as due 
to the perceived greater needs in the Wanni due to destruction from the war, 
organizations with a presence in the Wanni receive greater national and international 
media coverage. Programs in the Wanni offer increased publicity to potential donors in 
the countries of origin of INGOs. The Wanni has become, according to one INGO staff, a 
"sexy" place to go (interview 16). A final organizational consideration is tactical. Given 
the current political uncertainty, some INGOs feel that they should maintain a presence in 
the Wanni to respond to a possible resumption of conflict. 
Conclusions 
The current strategy of support for the peace dividend in the Wanni demands the 
rapid realization of projects with strong material benefits. The pressure created by this 
strategy plays into some common development traps. Wells and latrines are built at a 
blistering pace, leaving no time for proper hydrological assessments, or to involve 
communities in their creation to encourage longer term maintenance. Doing a tour of 
wells and latrines near PTK constructed two years previously by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), I found less than half in operation. Most had 
been rendered unusable from garbage that had been thrown into them. Of those that still 
held water, several housed turtles or fish. Numerous other wells and latrines in various 
states of disrepair marked the work of past projects by other organizations. Concurrently, 
an INGO was contracted by ECHO to build ninety more wells on a nine-month timetable 
(interview 5). One strategy for site location for this project was a local water divining 
technique, which uses a leaf split along its stem. 
Figure 5 Abandoned Latrines Near PTK 
(June 24,2003) 
Humanitarian considerations are an important reason for interventions in the 
Wanni. This objective is frequently conflated with either a peace dividend or long-term 
community development work. This confusion is at the heart of many post-conflict aid 
scenarios, which see an overlap of relief and development activities, often run in a 
competitive manner between organizations with differing specialties. Busumtwi-Sam 
(2002) argues that since rehabilitation work does not have the same conceptual clarity of 
either short-term, top down relief or long-term, bottom up development initiatives, 
organizations interpret reconstruction activities to fit with one or the other of these fields. 
Peace-building effects are not necessarily integral to either field. 
The experience of development organizations working in the Wanni illustrates 
both geopolitical and structural forces affecting conflict-sensitive aid work, as well as its 
theoretical weaknesses. While negative impacts of aid may be minimized, they are nearly 
impossible to eliminate. Aid agencies need to clearly define their objectives and decide 
whether the actions that they are engaged in will achieve these goals. This requires an 
ongoing analysis of their impact upon the changing conflict context. Furthermore, it 
requires an institutional commitment to follow through on the results of these analyses 
despite outside pressures. While several international NGOs interviewed in the Wanni in 
2003 clearly stated that they were not substantively addressing their community 
development mandates, only one was seriously debating curtailing their activities 
(interview 16). 
CHAPTER 5 
PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
This chapter examines assessments of the effects of peace-building and conflict- 
sensitive aid programs on conflict in Sri Lanka. These assessments are known as Peace 
and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIA). After a survey of the challenges facing the 
field of PCIA, the chapter examines in detail the initiative to focus PCIAs on national 
peace-building strategies. The chapter then revisits the strategy of support for the peace 
dividend, using the strategy as a case study of PCIAs in Sri Lanka. This case study 
highlights both the lack of robust PCIA methodologies, and the importance of conducting 
assessments at both the macro and micro levels. 
PCIA 
At this juncture, consolidating an end to Sri Lanka's war is likely an overly 
ambitious objective for aid agencies. Analysts of peace-building initiatives often stress 
the importance of setting achievable objectives and accepting long-term processes of 
change (Lederach, 1997; Harvey, 1997). The success of peace-building and conflict- 
sensitive aid programs at achieving modest objectives in Sri Lanka is also a question of 
debate. Several commentators claim that conflict-resolution mandates adopted by 
international aid agencies have made Sri Lanka's conflict worse. They advance reasons 
ranging from exacerbation of socio-economic inequalities to indirect support of the 
military capacities of the protagonists (Wickramasinghe, 2001; Rajasingham- 
Senanayake, 2003a; Bastian, 2003). 
Aid agencies engaged in peace-building and conflict-sensitive aid programs in Sri 
Lanka frequently underline the importance of their work in their literature (CARE, 2000; 
World Bank, 2003). Practitioners echo these claims (interviews 2 and 17). The fact that 
aid agencies cannot easily demonstrate the impacts of their programs on conflict reflects 
problems with assessment. These assessments go by several names, including Conflict 
Impact Assessments (CIA), Conflict Resolution Evaluations (CRE) and PCIA. These 
terms at times used to refer to specific tools and at times are applied to conflict impact 
assessments generally. The term PCIA will be used in this paper to refer to the full array 
of assessment practices, which span the project cycle starting from the planning stage to 
evaluation. There is great overlap between formal PCIA tools and informal practices 
which are part of ongoing project management. In order not to create an artificial 
distinction, PCIA will be used in this paper to refer to both formal tools and informal 
assessment processes incorporated into all stages of program management. 
PCIAs assess and address the positive and negative effects of aid programs on the 
conflict environments in which they operate. PCIAs are not limited to programs with 
specific peace-building objectives. They also apply to projects designed to be conflict- 
sensitive while maintaining focus on different mandates (FEWER, International Alert and 
Safenvorld, 2004). The field of PCIA is young, rough, and rapidly evolving. 
PCIA terminology gained wide currency with the publication of Kenneth Bush's 
1998 paper A measure ofpeace: Peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) of 
developmentprojects in conflict zones. Various forms of PCIA predate this (Anderson, 
1999; Bush, 1998). An official with CIDA in Colombo stated that while PCIA 
terminology is new, the process is not (interview 18). He noted that CIDA has done 
impact assessments since it started peace-building initiatives in Sri Lanka in the mid 
1990's. 
PCIAs face several serious challenges. The development of effective formal 
PCIA tools is hindered both by the profhion of types of aid initiatives to be assessed, and 
the rapid evolution of the peace-building field. Many peace-building projects are 
postulated to bring about broad political, social, and economic change. Establishing 
causality between project outputs and these types of change is difficult in conflict 
environments (Smith, 2004). There is also resistance to assessments at both the 
organizational and personal levels (Hoffman, 200 1). Underlying these factors are 
differing ideologies and theories regarding the morphology of conflict, the value of 
conflict and appropriate and effective ways to bring about change. A final challenge to 
PCIAs stems from their development being driven by donors and aid agencies. 
Recognizing the power inherent in assessment processes, ownership of PCIAs is 
contested. 
Breadth of field 
PCIAs suffer from what Dabelstein refers to as "methodological anarchy" (cited 
in Hoffman, 2001 : 2). One reason for this is the rapid recent development of the field. 
The government agency German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) notes that their work in 
Sri Lanka in 2000 was "the first time that 'conflict prevention, conflict transformation 
and peace building' was agreed upon by Germany and a partner country" (Kievelitz, 
Kruk and Frieters, 2003: 48). A further challenge to PCIA methodologies is found in the 
breadth of the field which PCIAs are meant to assess. Definitions of peace-building and 
conflict-sensitive programming cover a wide range of possible initiatives. This is 
exemplified in the definition of conflict-sensitive programming adopted in the PCIA 
resource pack created by FEWER, International Alert, and Safenvorld (2004), noted in 
Chapter Two. Formal PCIA tools reflect this broad definition. One example is the 
Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) developed by the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) 
for the European Commission. This tool is designed to incorporate a maximum number 
of variables into one comprehensive tool. The CIA uses a quantitative methodology to 
rank sixteen problem areas which are derived from four root causes of conflict. The 
sixteen problem areas are each further divided in sixteen sub-variables which are ranked 
for significance by the person doing the assessment on a scale of one to four. The CIA is 
designed to be used by "a wide range of desk officers who may not be deeply familiar 
with peace-building and conflict prevention matters" (Conflict Prevention Network, 
1999: 3). 
The CPN tool offers a broad and subjective view on possible courses of action. 
Hoffman (2001) states that PCIAs need to maintain a balance between contextual 
flexibility and usefulness. The attempt to maintain flexibility has negative consequences. 
PCIAs can be shaped to assess desired outcomes. This facilitates the subordination of 
peace-building and conflict-sensitive programming to other mandates, allowing aid 
agencies to use the new terminology to justify current aid practices and avoid 
fundamental changes in approach. The process of relabelling development and 
rehabilitation initiatives as peace-building, noted above in the Wanni, is ongoing in the 
rest of Sri Lanka as well. National structural adjustment programs and poverty reduction 
initiatives of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in Sri Lanka represent broad 
organizational mandates (Collier et al. 2003), not a response to the current political 
context (interview 5). 
Problems with attributing causality 
Many peace-building projects are designed to bring about changes in behaviours, 
attitudes and relationships. These factors are not easily assessed by standard evaluation 
practices. Leonhardt notes that "most recent evaluations of peacebuilding initiatives do 
not only conclude that their impact was relatively small; they also stress the hypothetical 
nature of this conclusion" (2001 : 8). Indictors set by peace-building programs such as 
increased sense of security or increased regional inter-communal cooperation are 
influenced by a broad range of circumstantial factors. This complicates the task of 
attributing causality to project activities. 
Of equal difficulty is determining how outcomes of individual projects play into 
conflict dynamics at different scales. Positive impacts on conflict at any level, be they 
local, regional or national, do not necessarily indicate positive impacts at other levels 
(Bauer, Bigdon and Korf, 1998). A classic example of this is when development 
programs providing social services free up government resources which are then used to 
increase military spending (Anderson, 1999). Problems with establishing causality and 
inter-level impacts are primary obstacles to the development of effective PCIA 
methodologies. 
Disputed ownership 
PCIAs have several possible roles in conflict-sensitive and peace-building 
initiatives. These roles can be contradictory, and as such are contested. For donors and 
practitioners, they offer tools of analysis, management and improved practice. They offer 
agencies a means to examine the effectiveness of programming strategies. They can also 
raise warning flags, highlighting activities that run counter to agencies' mandates. 
Conversely, PCIAs can be an integral, active part of empowerment-based initiatives 
aimed at transforming conflict from violent to non-violent forms. Lederach (1997) notes 
that evaluation is not a neutral, external element to interventions. He feels that it is and 
should be an intrinsic aspect of peace-building. This approach to PCIAs recognizes the 
power inherent in evaluation practices. Bush (200 la) criticized donors as having co-opted 
his initial PCIA model. What he envisioned as a participatory, process-orientated 
approach meant for use by Southern actors has been turned into a rigid tool of 
measurement designed to facilitate, not reconsider, the policies and mandates of 
intervening agencies. He states that "just as EWS (Early Warning Systems) get bracketed 
by larger political issues of national interest of the major powers, so does PCIA also 
become 'compartmentalized', so that donors can continue with foreign policies and trade 
practices which are patently peace-destroying or conflict-creating (ibid: 7)." 
Chapter Four described how participatory aid programs, such as civil society 
capacity building initiatives in the Wanni, require political freedom in which to operate. 
The same is true for participatory PCIAs. In the North, the LTTE frequently asserts 
control over local assessment inputs (interview 10). This undermines attempts to use 
substantive participatory assessment practices. Smith warns against the possibility of 
cooption of input processes by political actors, stating "beware axiomatic local 
ownership" (Smith, 2004: 26). Those implementing participatory PCIAs must be careful 
that assessments truly reflect the interests of those with whom the aid project intends to 
work. 
Clarity of theory 
PCIAs involve mapping meaning onto both conflict and practice. Peace-building 
and conflict-sensitive aid programs work within theoretical frameworks describing 
conflict, means of effecting change, and desired results which change should bring about 
(Church and Shouldice, 2003). While extensive theoretical analysis is frequently done by 
aid agencies at upper levels of management, the theoretical underpinnings of peace- 
building programs which advance liberal, realist, and radical ideologies are rarely made 
explicit in either conflict analyses or in project proposals for interventions in conflict 
situations. External evaluators may hold different theories than practitioners both about 
the nature of conflict and about ways to bring about change in conflicts. Lederach notes 
that "strategic and responsive evaluation.. . require(s) tools that help us clarify and 
evaluate the theories of change underlying, and the actions envisaged in, the design for 
peacebuilding." (1 997: 137). 
Mayer et al. (2003) stress that making the theories which inform programming 
clear should be an important part for PCIAs. Evaluating these theories is a further 
challenge. Theories informing peace-building initiatives are often hard to test in 
individual projects for the same reasons that broad impacts of individual projects are 
difficult to assess generally; establishing causal links between project outcomes and 
wider socio-economic and political change is difficult due to the large number of 
circumstantial factors. The difficulty with assessing the effectiveness of peace-building 
theories increases the importance of external pressures upon strategic planning, including 
both geopolitical pressures and the influence of the internal structural dynamics of 
implementing agencies. 
The role of geopolitics 
PCIAs are shaped by similar geopolitical pressures as effect peace-building 
initiatives and conflict-sensitive aid programs. Responding to the call for a greater 
articulation of theories behind international aid interventions, Bush (200 1 a) states that aid 
programming is shaped more by donor interests than it is by theories of what makes aid 
strategies effective. Aid agencies at all levels, from IFIs to NGOs, are under pressure 
from donor countries to take a proactive role in addressing Sri Lanka's conflict. The 
changing focus of major donors is due to two factors. Despite Sri Lanka's continued 
economic growth at the national level throughout the war until 200 1, there is new 
recognition that ending Sri Lanka's conflict is essential to achieving development goals 
and goals of poverty reduction. Links between poverty and conflict are stressed in 
analyses by IFIs (World Bank, 2003). 
Donor countries are also increasingly motivated by realist concerns of linkages 
between intrastate conflicts in countries with high levels of poverty and the security of 
Northern countries (Helton, 2002; Shaw, 2002; Collier et al. 2003). This factor has 
gained even greater attention since September 11 th. Bush notes that "in an increasingly 
globalized world, we see not only impact of the international on the local, but also the 
impact of the local on the international. Thus, local-level struggles and events are 
increasingly able to transcend their immediate political geography" (2001b: 262). The 
importance in national and regional conflicts of funding from diasporas, support for 
terrorist groups and globalized networks involved in the arms trade and in illicit resource 
markets have changed previous perceptions that these conflicts are strictly local issues 
(Grant, 2002; Hyndman, 2003; Shaw, 2002). 
The role of institutional structures 
Institutional structures also play a major role in shaping PCIAs. The influences of 
these structures are not always recognized, with the result that strategies adopted are 
assumed to have been chosen due to their efficacy at achieving objectives. Project time 
frames, the international management structure of foreign aid agencies, and competition 
amongst practitioners for aid resources all shape the types of initiatives selected. An 
example can be found in Puttalam district of western Sri Lanka. An audit of peace- 
building activities amongst 70 NGOs in Puttalam district found that 
. ..a number of these agencies exist only to attract funding rather than 
address community needs. One could view many existing agency 
objectives and project portfolios more as legacies of recent donor trends 
then reflective of constituency needs (Harris, 2002). 
A parallel exists amongst international NGOs (INGOs). 
Another structural factor shaping both aid initiatives and PCIAs is one which 
Prendergast refers to the 'law of the tool'. This law holds that "The nature of a response 
is in a large part dictated by the tools at hand" (1996: 7). This process can be seen in 
linkages drawn by the World Bank (WB) between poverty reduction strategies and 
increased political stability. Collier et al. describe civil war as a failure of development, 
noting that "where development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from 
violent conflict" (2003: 1). Setting the stage for the type of development advocated, they 
note that income inequalities have no impact on the propensity for conflict. These 
linkages make the WB's ongoing mandate of poverty reduction synonymous with its 
newer objective of engagement with conflict. Substantive analysis of the links between 
poverty reduction and conflict stabilization in Sri Lanka have not been done, however. 
PCIA and national strategies 
Critics of PCIAs claim that the practice has not been able to overcome the 
challenges it faces. Hoffman (200 1) suggests that effective PCIA methodologies have yet 
to be developed. Smith goes even further by concluding that "assessing the peacebuilding 
impact of an individual project is impossible" (2004: 59). One response to these 
criticisms has been to use PCIAs as tools in support of ongoing consolidation of aid 
programs under cohesive national strategies. An exhaustive study of peace-building 
projects by four major donors, the Utstein Report (ibid), calls for a shift in focus of 
assessments from project-level PCIAs to PCIAs for national peace-building strategies. It 
notes that "Impact assessment.. . should be removed from the project evaluation level and 
explored instead at the strategic level, asking whether the intervention strategy as a whole 
is working" (ibid 2004: 14). This call fits current donor trends towards greater 'policy 
coherence', integrating security, economic, and aid policy. A summary of Canadian 
International Development Agency's (CIDA) peace-building strategy by president Paul 
Thibault reflects this trend. He states that: 
We need to address peacebuilding multilaterally through our different 
channels - diplomacy, development and defence.. . CIDA gives 
approximately $1 00 million per year to other government departments to 
work in compatible areas and to create programming and policy coherence 
in key geographic areas overseas (2003: 3). 
Reinforcing cohesive national peace-building strategies is an important project, 
but it is not a substitute for assessing impacts of local-level projects on conflict. Despite 
its faults, ongoing PCIA is an intrinsic part of conflict-sensitive aid at all scales. The 
daily engagement of local aid projects with political authorities and divided communities 
have import in Sri Lanka's highly volatile, regionally distinct conflict. Local conflict 
contexts need to be addressed so that they do not disrupt the national peace processes 
(Rupesinghe, 2003a). Currently, project-level impact assessments in Sri Lanka are 
primarily informal processes, based on personal experience and judgement. Even 
practitioners experienced with formal PCIA techniques note that personal understanding 
and relationships remain their primary means of interpreting project impacts (interviews 
12 and 19). Critiques of current PCIA practice mean that the scope of PCIA tools needs 
to be adapted to specific scales of implementation. 
PCIA in Sri Lanka 
Examination of aid's negative impacts on Sri Lanka's conflict should be informed 
by aid's role in Sri Lanka's socio-economic and political evolution since independence. 
As instigators of change, including increased social and economic disparities and 
physical displacement, development projects are frequently the source of conflict at both 
the local and the national level. Negative impacts of specific aid projects can be directly 
linked to the evolution of Sri Lanka's conflict. An important instance is the Accelerated 
Mahaweli Dam and Irrigation Project mentioned in Chapter Three. This project is 
frequently pointed to as an important source of rising tensions between Tamils and 
Sinhalese during that period (Brun 2003; Seneviratne and Stavropoulou, 1998). 
Formal PCIAs have been used in Sri Lanka for over a decade. The 'Do No 
HarmlLocal Capacities for Peace' initiative, developed by Mary Anderson of the 
Collaborative for Development Action, ran some of its early projects in Sri Lanka in 
collaboration with CARE in 1997. This approach entails identifying and acting upon 
positive and negative 'connecting factors' in conflict environments (Anderson, 1999). 
Do No Harm has since become established internationally as one of the most popular 
approaches to designing and assessing conflict-sensitive programming. In the past few 
years, PCIAs have gained greater importance amongst Sri Lanka's donors (Mayer et al. 
2003). Recent studies and initiatives have been run by the Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
Swedish International Development Assistance, GTZ, the Berghoff Institute and the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in cooperation with the Consortium 
of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA). 
Despite these initiatives, the large majority of relief and development agencies in 
Sri Lanka do not use formal PCIA techniques to examine their programming. This is not 
just a reflection of its methodological difficulties. There is also active resistance to 
assessment. Hoffman (2001) notes that many organizations resist assessment for fear that 
their strategies will be shown to be ineffective. Another reason for resistance is that 
PCIAs are perceived to increase the complexity of project management. One director of a 
relief agency suggested that adopting a conflict-sensitive approach would require 
developing a new guide manual, and that the organization was too bureaucratic already 
(interview 20). An additional concern is that many of the larger international 
organizations, especially those which work closely with the government, are wary of 
offending their partner organizations. Demanding conflict-sensitive approaches from 
political organizations is highly sensitive. An official at the WB noted that as a young 
European dealing with government ministries, there was resentment of his calls for 
greater conflict sensitivity. People interpreted his calls as criticism that government 
departments had discriminatory hiring practices towards Tamils. The WB official insisted 
that a more subtle, savvy approach was required (interview 13). 
The WB official's comment reflects the importance of personal experience and 
relationships in conflict-sensitive programming. Most practitioners talked with, including 
in larger organizations with exposure to PCIA methodologies, described personal 
experience and judgement as their principal source of knowledge and analysis of the 
impact of their programs on the conflict (interview 2 1). A director of a Sri Lankan 
research group suggested that "our PCIA is accumulated experience in Sri Lanka, with 
awareness of parallel processes in the world" (ibid). Several organizations further 
claimed that personal experience was the only realistic way to operate. This opinion was 
shared by people working both in community reconciliation initiatives and at IFIs 
(interviews 13 and 17). The director of a UN conflict-resolution program stated that due 
to the complexity of the Sri Lankan context, a thorough, formal conflict analysis was 
unrealistic. Even if a proper conflict assessment could be done, because of the dynamic 
nature of the conflict context it would only be a snapshot. He felt that this approach 
would be of limited usefulness (interview 12). 
PCIA, scope and scale 
Smith is very clear in his dismissal of project-level PCIAs. In reference to 
ongoing attempts to develop PCIAs, he states that "we should simply admit failure. So far 
as we know, there is no way to assess the impact of individual projects and we should 
therefore stop trying to do it" (2004: 52). Smith's point is overly broad. Ongoing 
assessment of the impact of aid projects on local conflict context is intrinsic to program 
management, even if not done as a formal PCIA exercise. PCIA training sessions in Sri 
Lanka often start by recognizing ways in which aid projects are already conflict-sensitive. 
These include the personal experience, skills and relationships of practitioners (Fewer et 
al. 2003b; UNHCR, 2003b). In order to devise PCIA tools to improve upon current 
practice, the strengths and weaknesses of PCIAs should be differentiated at local and 
national levels. Some of these factors have been laid out in Table Two. 
Table 2 Strengths and Weaknesses of PCIA at Different Scales 
Project 
Level 
PCIA 
National 
Strategic 
PCIA 
Strengths 
OContextual knowledge 
OPersonal skills/relationships 
UAwareness of local impacts 
UResponsive to local conflict dynamics 
OLocal ownership1 can be integrated as 
part of project implementation 
OSupports a national peace-building 
strategy 
OGreater resources available 
OLess susceptible to local political 
factors 
OGreater ability to measure social/ 
politicall economic impacts 
OInstitutional structures 
-can shape overall portfolio 
-economies of scale increase 
efficiency 
Weaknesses 
OLack of national perspective 
OPersonal bias 
UInability to measure social1 politicall 
economic impact 
OSusceptible to local political influence 
OKnowledge difficult to institutionalize 
OInstitutional structures 
-responses shaped by tools available 
-projects shaped by organizational 
interests 
OBlind to local effects in regionalized 
conflict 
OLack of local ownership 
OSusceptible to nationall international 
geopolitical factors 
OKnowledge transfer to field difficult 
OInstitutional structures 
-responses shaped by tools available 
Project level PCIAs have several weaknesses. Reliance upon personal experience 
as a primary means of assessment presents obvious dangers. People have a natural 
tendency to believe in the importance of work that they are doing, and to justify actions 
already undertaken. Reliance upon personal experience is open to the critique that people 
avoid assessment for fear that it will show that they are not achieving their objectives 
(Church and Shouldice, 2003). Local PCIAs are also subject to local political influence, 
both through manipulation of the assessment process, and to the extent PCIA 
practitioners have greater vested interests in project success than in broader outcomes. 
Project level PCIAs also have strengths. Foremost amongst these is simply that 
they analyze conflict from local and regional perspectives. Maintaining both national and 
local level analysis is crucial in Sri Lanka's highly regionalized conflict, where tensions 
over local issues can lead to national destabilization. A CARE strategy report notes that: 
Because of this potential discrepancy in issues between the various 
conflict affected regions, a regular and thorough situation analysis is 
important to ensure that CARE'S work in the regions are appropriate and 
relevant. Such a situation analysis will not only highlight the issues that 
afflict each of the conflict affected regions but also provide a broader 
picture of the regions as a whole, so that a more comprehensive picture of 
the process towards peace and the overall changes and implications of 
such changes that one region may have on another can be determined 
(Care, 2003b). 
The difference between project and national level PCIAs is not just in the quality 
and quantity of information which can be gathered. If well designed and implemented, 
project-level PCIAs allow for participant ownership of assessment practices. Local 
PCIAs can also be designed as integral parts of peace-building and conflict-sensitive 
development projects. CARE'S participatory Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (DME) 
process is an attempt at this (ibid). PCIAs of national peace-building strategies are 
definitively orientated towards donors and aid agencies. 
Developing cohesive national peace-building strategies is an important objective. 
Macrae (200 1) notes that rehabilitation activities are often highly 'projectised', and that 
the advancement of individual projects can replace national rehabilitation strategy. Smith 
states that "with a strategic deficit, however good each individual activity is, there is a 
deficiency of control, therefore of responsibility and accountability, and it is less likely 
that the goals of policy will be achieved" (2004: 44). PCIAs conducted at the level of 
national coordination have greater time and monetary resources available for in-depth 
analysis. These assessments can also be a useful resource for smaller agencies with less 
capacity to sustain ongoing assessments. 
PCIA and the peace dividend 
The strengths and weaknesses of PCIAs can be seen in attempts at assessing the 
strategy of support for the peace dividend as adopted by international agencies in Sri 
Lanka. Supporting the peace dividend is a strategy which appeals to imprecise, difficult- 
to-measure theories. Despite support for the peace dividend being a central peace- 
building strategy for donors, the peace dividend's impact is more a matter of public 
debate than it is of systematic assessment. There is frequent discussion in academia and 
in the media about whether or not a peace dividend has materialized, and if so, whether or 
not it has benefited those with a stake in the conflict (Adiga, 2003). This is particularly 
true in the North and East. While there is substantial construction activity in 
Killinochichi, donor agency and NGO staff have differing opinions about whether or not 
there have been widespread improvements in people's standards of living in LTTE- 
occupied areas. Opinions over the degree of improvement in livelihoods ranged from 
substantial (interview 11) to none (interview 12). While several INGOs have carried out 
livelihood surveys (interview lo), during interviews most officials' responses were made 
based on personal judgement without reference to substantial analysis at the 
organizational level. The measurement of improvements in livelihoods is complicated by 
a paucity of baseline information from before the cease-fire (ibid). 
The difficulty of assessing the impacts of the strategy of support for the peace 
dividend means that practice easily accommodates geopolitical considerations. It allows 
for the uninterrupted continuation of previous initiatives, and the pursuit of mandates not 
related to the peace process. Bastian states that the linkage of national economic 
mandates with the peace process has allowed the UNF government to carry out financial 
reforms which the IFIs had been pushing for several years (interview 22). Promotion of 
the WB's international poverty reduction goals are further facilitated by perceived 
linkages between economic prosperity and peace, which allows for a re-packaging of 
these programs as peace-building initiatives. The flexibility offered by the strategy of 
support for the peace dividend also reduces the need for constant analysis and 
institutional dynamism. Short of a return to major combat or a complete disengagement 
of the LTTE from the donor community, evolution of context does not require a change 
in basic strategy. Increased and increasing prosperity are seen as foundations of the 
current daente. 
The debate over the scale of the peace dividend does not get at the deeper 
question of how changing prosperity influences the propensity for Sri Lankans to return 
to war. It is clear that not all investments in Sri Lanka contribute to a furthering of the 
peace process. A primary concern today is the manner in which foreign funds contribute 
to building capacities for future war. This is true in both the government and the LTTE- 
controlled areas. This task is complicated by the fact that the economic structure and war 
incentives within the LTTE are not well known. Goodhand and Atkinson note that 
without better empirical understanding, "it is unlikely that outsiders will be able to affect 
incentive systems to transform the war economy into a peace economy.. ." (2001 : 30). 
This statement underlines the need for project level PCIAs. 
Conclusions 
A central difficulty facing PCIAs is achieving operational usefulness while 
remaining sufficiently comprehensive to examine the breadth of potential impacts on 
conflict. This difficulty is particularly acute for organizations adopting conflict-sensitive 
approaches to programming, as opposed to those engaged in explicit peace-building 
activities. Most PCIAs are sufficiently broad and subjective to allow for conflict-sensitive 
factors to be easily subordinated to organizational and political considerations. Despite 
this subordination, conflict-sensitive aspects of programs are often used as a justification 
for programming. Lacking clear assessments of its positive and negative impacts on 
conflict at both national and regional levels, support for the peace dividend is a clear 
example of this process. 
The argument for tailoring PCIAs to specific scales recognizes that certain 
objectives originally envisioned for project PCIAs must be abandoned. The ability to 
discern broad impacts of local projects must be accepted to be outside of the ability of 
current tools to detect. Limiting the scope of project PCIAs is not a loss to project level 
assessment, as these objectives are not currently being achieved. Limiting the scope of 
project PCIAs focuses them on their areas of strength, recognizing where current 
assessments are weakest. Likewise, the development of national PCIAs needs to be 
informed by the weaknesses of practice at the macro level. Foremost amongst these is the 
influence of geopolitical pressures external to the peace-building mandate. 
The manner in which the strategy of support for the peace dividend has developed 
in Sri Lanka demonstrates the importance of project PCIAs. National strategies of IFIs 
focusing on poverty and livelihoods are less concerned about the transfer of resources 
from individual projects to the LTTE than are the practitioners who manage the projects 
from which resources are being taken. It is at the project level that contradictory 
outcomes produced by competing theories informing strategies are often most apparent. 
These results need to be more systematically integrated into national strategies. Project 
PCIAs are also important for addressing political issues relating to minority groups 
sidelined in the main peace process. Tensions around the continued displacement of 
Muslims from LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka, whose right to return has consistently 
been underemphasized in the peace process, offers an example (Hasbullah, 2001). 
Measuring causal linkages between aid interventions and broad social, political, 
and economic change remains a challenge. In an attempt to address this difficulty, 
Lederach (1997) commends theory-based evaluation. This tool, originally developed by 
Carol Weiss for social programs, examines the implicit and explicit theories of change 
behind practice. Theory-based evaluation has not yet proven itself to be a robust 
methodology. Having conducted an extensive review of literature, Church and Shouldice 
claim that "to date there is not a dominant application of the theory-based approach; nor 
is there one single method for uncovering the theory of change underpinning an 
intervention" (2003: 4 1). 
There are various proposals to address the problem of establishing causality. 
Leonhardt (2001) surveys four current techniques: 'Sequential analysis is a longitudinal 
study of relationships between interventions and desired change; 'matching methods' 
derives best practices from conflict analyses; 'meanings and perceptions' underlines the 
fact that perceptions of project impacts are as important in shaping political events as 
impacts themselves; 'logical plausibility', which includes problem trees, is a strategy for 
designing hypotheses of possible impacts. Smith (2004) states that better methods for 
establishing causality may yet be developed. He suggests that game theory and chaos 
theory offer promising ways to study social change. 
These approaches hold promise. A necessary component of Sequential Analysis is 
a dataset of social change over time. One example of this in Sri Lanka is the Peace 
Confidence Index produced by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (2004) of Colombo. 
This longitudinal survey measures changing attitudes towards the conflict, standards of 
living and recent political events, categorizing the findings by Sri Lanka's main ethnic 
groups. This type of information could be usefully incorporated into national PCIAs. 
The current donor pressure in Sri Lanka for peace-building and conflict-sensitive 
aid strategies is an opportunity to further develop PCIA practice. Current practice in Sri 
Lanka, however, highlights the danger of aid organizations claiming to be supporting the 
peace process as a justification for different organizational interests. While there is 
abundant academic discussion of the historical negative impacts of aid work on Sri 
Lanka's conflict (Bastian, 2003; Rajasingharn-Senanayake, 2003a), little formal 
retrospective analysis has been done within aid agencies. A parallel can be drawn with 
the current situation. If there is a resumption of conflict in Sri Lanka, it is unlikely that 
PCIAs will be done to assess the role of current aid strategies in the collapse of the peace 
process, or of how aid organizations may have increased capacities for war. For agencies 
recognizing their potential negative impacts on the conflict, PCIAs are a necessary 
component of engaging in responsible aid practice. Support for the peace dividend offers 
advantages to larger aid organizations who have little accountability for their strategies if 
conflict were to resume. If Sri Lanka does return to war, it is unlikely that a retroactive 
analysis by an IF1 or other major donor would determine that the strategy of support for 
the peace dividend had been a mistake, and try to document ways in which the policy 
contributed to a worsening of future conflict. For obvious reasons, these assessments 
need to be made now. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the differences and contrasts between peace-building 
and conflict-sensitive aid strategies in Sri Lanka. The lack of clarity between competing 
ideologies, theories, and resultant strategies is stressed as an important hindrance to the 
effectiveness of many agencies. Suggestions for improving practice are laid out in the 
policy section of this chapter. The chapter then relates the thesis' findings to the broader 
framework of international aid. 
Ideas before strategies 
This thesis has examined several challenges facing conflict-sensitive aid and 
peace-building programs in Sri Lanka. Among these, emphasis has been placed on the 
lack of conceptual clarity informing conflict-sensitive and peace-building initiatives. As 
Smith notes in his study of Utsein countries, "no U4 country has what any of the research 
teams was prepared to characterise without reservation as "a policy" on peacebuilding" 
(2004: 42). A minority of aid agencies invest substantial resources into either conflict 
analysis or into developing cohesive plans of action based on theory. As a result, factors 
not related to peace-building objectives have substantial influence on programming. 
Agencies engaging in conflict-sensitive aid and peace-building programming 
must address core issues concerning values and mandates. Agencies need to develop 
functional definitions of conflict, articulate desired and possible objectives, and decide 
what are effective and appropriate means to bring about change. Recognizing both the 
constructive and destructive aspects of conflict, agencies must also distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate forms of conflict. Fundamentally different approaches are 
indicated depending upon whether agencies simply attempt to mitigate negative impacts 
of their activities, proactively embark upon projects of conflict resolution, or adopt a 
mandate of allegiance with disadvantaged actors. 
Strategies in conflict 
Canadem (2004), a Canadian peace-building recruitment agency, divides peace- 
building into fourteen separate fields. It presents these fields as complementary activities. 
In contrast, Table One in Chapter Two of this thesis showed peace-building strategies 
categorized by ideology, associated with distinct goals. Conflict exists not only between 
ideologies; strategies also encompass differing and competing goals. This thesis has 
examined in depth two peace-building strategies used by aid organizations in Sri Lanka: 
civil society strengthening in the Wanni and support for the peace dividend. Table One 
found these strategies to be broadly based across ideological categories. Table Three lists 
the strengths and weaknesses of these strategies, in relation to the four ideologies that this 
thesis has engaged. 
Table 3 Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Sri Lankan Peace-Building Strategies 
Realist 
Liberal 
Radical 
Conflict 
Resolution 
Civil Society Strengthening in 
the Wanni 
Not Applicable 
Strengths 
+ Contributes to peace dividend 
+ Possible influence on LTTE 
structure 
Weaknesses 
- Ignores negative conflict impacts 
- In conflict with LTTE 
- Currently weak civil society 
- Universalized approach 
Strengths 
+ Contributes to focused peace dividend 
+ Addresses inequities 
Weaknesses 
- Ignores negative conflict impacts 
- In conflict with LTTE 
- Lack of basic freedoms 
- Potential back-lash 
Strengths 
+ Contributes to peace dividend 
+ Possible influence on LTTE structure 
Weaknesses 
- Ignores negative conflict impacts 
- In conflict with LTTE 
- Currently weak civil society 
Support for the Peace Dividend 
Strengths 
+ Flexible 
+ Rapid 
Weaknesses 
- Different strategies required at different scales 
- Requires specific targeting 
Strengths 
+ Flexible 
+ Rapid 
+ Positive spins-offs (such as economic 
benefits) 
Weaknesses 
- Different strategies required at different scales 
- Negative spin-offs (such as corruption) 
- Overly broad range of strategies 
Strengths 
+ Destabilization of power structures 
+ Increased equality 
Weaknesses 
- Different strategies required at different scales 
- Entrenched power structures 
Strengths 
+ Positive spins-offs (such as economic 
benefits) 
+ Opportunity for reduced conflict over 
resources 
Weaknesses 
- Different strategies required at different scales 
- New potentials for competition over resources 
While congruency of strengths exists between categories, such as the contribution 
of civil society strengthening to the peace dividend, Table Three shows clear differences 
between ideological categories for both civil society strengthening in the Wanni and 
support for the peace dividend. Liberal theories of civil society strengthening initiatives 
envision civil society as a stabilizing force within an eventual democratic political 
structure. Radical theories of civil society strengthening describe community 
empowerment as an inherently conflictual mechanism for obtaining increased equality. 
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Both of these potential goals for civil society strengthening were described by 
practitioners in the Wanni (interviews 10 and 17). Negative impacts of these approaches, 
including, respectively, strengthening of established exploitative power structures and 
increased local conflict, can be mutually counterproductive. 
Table Three also notes that strategies can encompass several approaches within 
ideological categories. These approaches are often informed by competing theories. Scale 
of implementation and appropriate targeting are frequent sources of division within 
strategies. For example, strategies of support for the peace dividend differ depending on 
whether the target is the general population or key decision-makers within the 
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Corrupt implementation 
of rehabilitation programs can be seen as undermining a popular peace dividend, or can 
been seen as stabilizing insofar as personal profit of corrupt officials is a deterrent to the 
resumption of hostilities. 
A result of the lack of clarity between diverse and competing theories informing 
peace-building strategies is that aid agencies and individuals apply several theories 
simultaneously. An example of this can be seen in debates over the meaning of the peace 
dividend. While the majority of aid agencies define the peace dividend in economic 
terms, an official with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) stressed 
that a meaningful and effective peace dividend entailed improvements in human rights 
(interview 18). In the following sentence he called the peace dividend a carrot, with the 
implication that it was an economic process. 
Conflict between strategies can therefore be traced to differing ideologies, 
theories, and to lack of clarity as to which goals and theories inform programming. 
Difficulties with assessment further complicate practice. Weak assessments make it 
difficult for agencies to measure the relative effectiveness of different approaches, either 
within or between ideological frameworks. 
Theories and assessments informing programming attempt to portray peace- 
building as an empirical process. As such, parallels can be drawn with critiques of 
science made in the field of philosophy of science. Hoberg (2004) notes that science can 
be a resource for strategic actors. It both lends credibility to chosen courses of action, and 
acts as a shield to deflect criticism of ineffective programming (Clark et al. 1998). Due to 
the difficulties of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIA) in producing 
quantifiable results as to the effectiveness of various strategies, organizations fall back 
upon theory to justify action. Theory takes on a strategic role. 
Conflict and confusion over peace-building strategies help explain the strong 
influence that pressures external to peace-building mandates have on programming in Sri 
Lanka. Pressures on the strategies of civil society strengthening in the Wanni and support 
for the peace dividend, as well as pressures on PCIA, are laid out in Table Four. 
Table 4 Pressures on Peace-Building Strategies and PCIA 
Civil Society 
Strengthening in the 
Political 
Pressures 
Peace Dividend 
Wanni 
G 'Developmental' relief 
0 Participatory culture 
Pressures 
from 
Institutional 
Structures 
O Pressure for neo-liberal 
economic reforms 
U Greater funds for peace- 
building activities 
0 Universalized approach 
Pressure for programs in 
L'ITE- controlled areas 
0 Donor attempts to 'balance' 
U Agenda setting by lFls 
0 Use of familiar tools 
0 ISGA necessary for 
implementation 
U Ease of coordination of 
large funds 
Peace and Conflict 
Impact 
Assessments 
C Ownership 
n Debate over scale 
O Donor need to 
demonstrate funds are 
effective 
L7 Lack of conflict analysis 
Agency need to justify 
activities 
O Difficult to transmit 
results throughout 
organization 
Peace-building programming differs across Sri Lanka. Theories and ideologies 
interact with political and institutional considerations to create regionally specific 
programming. Political pressures have produced different approaches to support for the 
peace dividend in the North and South of the country. In the South, International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) play a more direct role in setting aid agency agendas. 
Rajasingham-Senanayake (2003b), claiming that the reconstruction of Sri Lanka is 
shaped by the agendas of international finance and corporate capital, questions the 
relative importance of the World Bank (WB) over the United Nations (UN) in managing 
Sri Lanka's reconstruction. She states that "post-conflict reconstruction, a growth 
industry in world development industry led by World Bank Institutions, is about 
information asymmetries, global-local hierarchies of knowledge and power and the 
marketing of myths and models of development" (ibid: 2). In contrast, attempts at using 
the peace-dividend to advance donor mandates in LTTE controlled areas of the North 
have been strongly resisted. The failure of the LTTE to appear at the 2003 Tokyo 
Conference saw a decrease in attempts by donors to link aid to improvements in human- 
rights. The IFIs do not have a mandate to put forms of pressure on LTTE fiscal practices 
such as those that they exert on the GoSL. 
Policy suggestions 
Conflict-sensitive aid and peace-building programming in Sri Lanka in the fall of 
2004 took place in a context of political instability. While there has not been a return to 
large-scale combat, re-escalation of the conflict remains a strong possibility. Le Billon 
(2000) notes that contemporary conflicts are often situations of neither total war nor 
peace, but rather of chronic instability, vulnerability, widespread violence, and recurrent 
crises. This description is applicable to Sri Lanka. Recognizing the potential for a return 
to major combat in Sri Lanka does not negate the value of the peace process. Simply in 
terms of casualties, Rupesinghe (2003b) suggests that in the first year of the cease-fire ten 
thousand lives were saved and fifteen thousand less people were injured. Aid agencies 
need to shape programming in accordance with Sri Lanka's protracted conflict by 
reframing goals. This includes setting achievable objectives. 
This thesis has frequently highlighted the lack of clarity informing current 
programming in Sri Lanka. Both clarity of mandate and clarity of theory informing 
strategies are necessary for successful interventions. Smith (2004) warns of the danger of 
slipping into a development 'default mode' in situations where concepts of peace- 
building are unclear. Conflict resolution requires relevant conflict analysis both prior to 
and during interventions, as well as meaningful assessment of program impacts. Conflict 
analyses are difficult and time consuming. They are difficult to translate into policy, and 
difficult to disseminate throughout large organizations. Due to the dynamism of Sri 
Lanka's conflict, conflict analyses quickly become dated. A Humanitarian Policy Group 
(2003) report states that "detailed conflict analysis remains largely at the margins of most 
programming in complex emergencies." These difficulties do not negate their 
importance. Several practices can improve the relevance and accessibility of conflict 
analyses. Smaller organizations can refer to conflict analyses carried out by larger 
organizations which have greater resources. Comprehensive analyses which explore the 
spectrum of root causes of Sri Lanka's conflict currently exist, such as Goodhand's Aid, 
conflict, andpeace building in Sri Lanka (2001). Another useful approach is to focus 
analysis to scales relevant to planned interventions. This is of particular importance in Sri 
Lanka where there is great regional variation in sources of tension. Aid agencies can also 
focus on developing tools which supplement ongoing informal analysis at the project 
level. The formalization of the process could be one of the greatest advantages of 
adopting tools such as the brainstorming techniques described in Anderson's (1999) book 
"Do No Harm". 
These suggestions, pooling of resources, scale specificity, and building on current 
practices, are equally relevant for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAs). 
PCIAs can be improved upon at both the national strategic level and the project level. 
Organizations can focus on developing tools which supplement the contextual knowledge 
which practitioners currently have and use. The structural introduction of explicit tools 
can ensure that these processes become more systematic, explicit, and collaborative. They 
can also ensure that assessments refer to mandates, theories of change, and selected 
strategies. 
A further priority for international aid agencies in Sri Lanka is to explicitly 
recognize and address pressures on programming external to peace-building goals. Some 
of these pressures may be important and have value in their own right. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) need to look after their strategic interests in order to maintain 
organizational capacity and effectiveness. These pressures and interests should not be 
confused with those aspects of programs which make them conflict-sensitive, however. 
The peace dividend should not become a default peace-building strategy due to its 
practical advantages for agencies scaling up programming to meet new funding 
opportunities. 
Broader issues 
While Sri Lanka has experienced an increase in programs described as peace- 
building and conflict-sensitive, there has been only a moderate shift in programming 
strategies. A parallel can be drawn between this process and development programming 
in Rwanda previous to the 1994 genocide. Uvin (1 998) describes how, despite escalating 
violence in the years before the genocide in Rwanda, international aid agencies continued 
with entrenched development practices which contributed to structures of violence and 
exclusion. He states that "At no point did the aid community sit down and try to 
fundamentally redefine its missions, goals and functioning" (ibid:237). Uvin further notes 
that only one percent of foreign aid in Rwanda prior to 1994 was directed to intervene "in 
favour of forces of moderation and compromise" (ibid:237). This is an example of the 
path dependency of international aid. 
Peace-building nomenclature has since evolved more than practice. If definitions 
of peace-building currently used in Sri Lanka were applied to the Rwandan context 
before 1994, a majority of aid would now qualify as peace-building. The equation of 
development with political stability greatly broadens the definition of peace-building. 
Support for the peace dividend as currently pursued in Sri Lanka further dilutes the 
concept. While Rwanda is an extreme example of failure by aid agencies to engage with 
conflict, agencies need to remain aware of the aid industry's historical resistance to 
change due to local factors. One means of addressing resistance to change is to 
incorporate strategic conflict analysis into evaluation. 
Entrenched approaches to aid programming are often closely linked to the 
entrenched nature of the conflicts in which they operate. Uyangoda (2003a) suggests that 
separatist wars never really end. As important to the evolution of aid programming in Sri 
Lanka are international trends in the changing relationship between humanitarian relief 
and development. The scenario of protracted violence and recurrent crises undermines the 
dichotomy of relief during times of war and development during times of peace. Donor 
use of aid to avoid political involvement in protracted crises, as well as increased focus 
on developmental values of participation, have diminished the importance of achieving 
political stability and legitimacy prior to movement from relief to development 
modalities. The distinction between relief and development has been blurred, with 
developmental approaches such as local ownership and capacity building being 
implemented even in contexts of acute crisis. Initiatives such as these are referred to as 
'developmental humanitarianism' (Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 
2003). Macrae (2001) considers developmental humanitarianism to have become 
orthodoxy amongst aid agencies. She notes that there is a consensus that "developmental 
approaches can and should be adopted during conflict. Developmental approaches are 
now seen to have a role not simply in peace-building, but also in peace-making (ibid: 
157)." 
Programs such as civil society strengthening in the Wanni are examples of 
developmental humanitarianism in Sri Lanka. The lack of clarity as to strategies of 
implementation means that programming is as much as reflection of international trends 
as it is a proactive engagement with Sri Lankan peace-building opportunities. The end 
result is a serious undermining of peace-building and conflict-sensitive practice in Sri 
Lanka. 
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